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KRISTIN NOELLE CASPER*

Oil and Gas Development in the
Arctic: Softening of Ice Demands
Hardening of International Law
ABSTRACT
The melting of Arctic sea ice, caused by climate change, presents
opportunities for access to new oil and gas reserves in the Arctic.
With access comes the risk of damaging the unique and fragile Arctic
environment and threatening already vulnerable Arctic communities
and indigenous peoples. This article focuses primarily on the rights
of Arctic coastal states to explore and exploit oil and gas on their
continental shelves, their obligations in conducting such activities,
and particular conditions under which exploration and exploitation
of Arctic resources should be prohibited. According to the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, the current position of Arctic coastal states is that
there is no need to develop a new comprehensive international regime for the Arctic. However, the existing soft law arrangements for
the Arctic and the international agreements and principles pertaining to the Arctic do not provide sufficient protection for the Arctic
marine environment from the adverse impacts of new oil and gas
exploration and exploitation. A better approach for the Arctic coastal
states is to develop a regional legally binding agreement that regulates oil and gas development on the Arctic coastal states’ continental shelves. The Arctic is facing a complete meltdown—new
pressures demand a new agreement.

I. INTRODUCTION
If the Arctic coastal states have it their way, the Arctic Ocean will
not only be free of ice in the coming years but also of new and additional
governance and regulation. While Arctic sea ice rapidly melted in early
summer of 2008, the five Arctic coastal states issued the Ilulissat Declaration, stating that there is “no need to develop a new comprehensive in-

* Kristin Casper obtained her Juris Doctor from the University of New Mexico
School of Law in 2009. The author would like to thank: Dr. Erik Jaap Molenaar,
Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea (NILOS), Utrecht University, and Professor
Reed Benson, University of New Mexico School of Law, for providing advice on various
drafts of this article; Adam Shore for inspiring her to research legal means to protect the
Arctic; and Richard and Susan Casper for their unconditional support. This article was
completed in June 2009, and so does not take into account legal or political developments
that have occurred since that date.
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ternational legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean.” 1 This decision to
allow the Arctic Ocean to remain generally unregulated comes at a time
when the meltdown presents lucrative opportunities for expanded access
to new shipping routes, fisheries, and oil and gas resources. The Arctic
area2 comprises territory of eight states: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the Russian Federation (Russia), and the United
States. The Arctic Ocean is a sea surrounded by five coastal states: Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway (Svalbard), Russia, and the United
States (hereinafter “Arctic coastal states”).3
The burning of fossil fuels like oil, gas, and coal, has in effect created the conditions for the Arctic to be drillable, providing access to
more oil and gas.4 According to the U.S. Geological Survey, 25 percent of
the world’s remaining oil and gas reserves may be in the Arctic.5 In-

1. ARCTIC COUNCIL, THE ILULISSAT DECLARATION 2 (Ilulissat, Greenland, May 28,
2008), available at http://arctic-council.org/filearchive/Ilulissat-declaration.pdf [hereinafter
THE ILULISSAT DECLARATION].
2. The Arctic is defined in many ways. In general, most definitions of the Arctic cover
at least part of the sovereign land or marine territory of the eight Arctic states. PHILIPPE
SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 534 (Cambridge University
Press 2003) (1995). Rosemary Rayfuse explains that the definition of the Arctic depends on
perspective, i.e., ecological, political, etc.:
The Arctic is usually referred to as comprising all areas lying north of the
Arctic Circle, or 66°33’ north latitude. Ecologically speaking, a more accurate defining criterion for the Arctic region may be the northern limit of
the tree line, the existence of which is based on temperature. Alternately,
the Arctic is also sometimes defined as a northern region where the average July temperature is under 10ºC. Both of these ecological descriptions
encompass an area considerably larger than that enveloped by the Arctic
Circle. For political purposes, too, the definition of the Arctic varies depending on the subject matter under discussion and on the interests of the
discussants. Definitions include all areas north of 60° north, or all areas
north of the Arctic Circle but with an exception to include all of Iceland, or
simply all areas north of the Arctic Circle.
Rosemary Rayfuse, Melting Moments: The Future of Polar Oceans Governance in a Warming
World, 16 REV. OF EUR. COMMUNITY & ENVTL. INT’L L. 196, 197 (2007).
3. Travis Potts, An Arctic Scramble? Opportunities and Threats in the (Formerly) Frozen
North, 23 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 151, 151–52 (2008).
4. See Kate Galbraith, A New Blog on Energy and the Environment, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/24/business/businessspecial2/24blog.html?_r=
1&scp=2&sq=kate=galbraith%2C==September=24%2c=2008&st=nyt (“The opening of the
Arctic is a ‘perverse situation,’ according to Steven Signer, the head of the European climate and energy policy unit for the environmental group WWF, formerly the World Wildlife Fund. ‘The same resources which are burned—oil, gas and we should mention coal, as
well’ are ‘the cause of the Arctic to be drillable and despoiled for oil and gas.’”).
5. Colin Woodard, Who Resolves Arctic Oil Disputes?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug.
20, 2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0820/p01s02-woeu.html. However, the accuracy of this statistic is not clear. See Potts, supra note 3, at 154 n.17 (“The statistical authority
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creased oil extraction in the Arctic will boost economic activity, yet it
could also cause severe environmental damage and exacerbate global climate change by increasing the availability of oil and gas to be consumed
around the world, which in turn, will release more greenhouse pollutants into the atmosphere—an extraction positive feedback loop that
could forever alter the Arctic marine environment.
Increased exploitation of fossil fuels is at odds with many efforts
being made in international environmental law, in particular the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).6 However, it should be noted that on its own, prohibiting the extraction of oil
and gas in the Arctic will neither completely protect the Arctic ecosystem
and marine biodiversity from the impacts of climate change nor solve the
global climate crisis. Outside the scope of this article is the necessity for a
comprehensive and aggressive climate agreement that will not only protect the Arctic but also slow the impact of climate change around the
world. While the Arctic coastal states would benefit from a boom in oil
and gas exploration and exploitation, the Arctic coastal states should at
the very minimum agree to a legally binding regional Arctic marine environment agreement that regulates oil and gas development and ensures environmental protection. This will give the Arctic states the
opportunity to explore and exploit7 the natural resources available, but
within reason and in accordance with international law, instead of with
reckless abandon.
Under international law, Arctic coastal states have sovereignty,
sovereign rights, and jurisdiction to explore and exploit oil and gas on
their continental shelves, but there may also be legal limits to their actions and potential opportunities for regional cooperation to protect one
of the world’s final frontiers. In light of the fact that the Arctic environment is unique and its dependent communities and indigenous peoples
are vulnerable,8 the Arctic coastal states should retract the Ilulissat Declaoften cited to support this view is the United States Geological Survey’s (USGS) 2000 estimate that the Arctic may hold as much as 25% of the world’s undiscovered resources.” Yet,
“[i]t is notable that the USGS findings . . . does [sic] not, in fact, even make mention of the
Arctic specifically.” (citing http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs-062-03/FS-062-03.pdf)).
6. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC], available at http://unfccc.int/essential_background/
convention/items/2627.php. All of the Arctic states are a party to this Convention, which
is aimed at the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” Id. art.
2.
7. For an explanation of what is meant by exploration and exploitation, see section
II(B).
8. This article does not provide in-depth background on the Arctic environment,
marine biodiversity, and the impacts of climate change on Arctic communities and peoples,
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ration and move forward with a legally binding regional agreement to
prevent unfettered oil and gas exploitation. Along with global efforts to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, such as the UNFCCC and the associated Kyoto Protocol,9 the Arctic marine environment has a fighting
chance to survive the current crisis if an Arctic marine agreement is
included.
This article details the Arctic coastal states’ rights to explore and
exploit oil and gas reserves on their continental shelves and their obligations in conducting such activities. It analyzes existing arrangements that
are applicable to the Arctic and proposes a new regime and mechanisms
for Arctic cooperation that will provide greater protection. Section II
highlights the impacts of climate change and oil and gas development.
Section III provides background on the sources of international law, and
then analyzes Arctic soft law arrangements in contrast with the hard law
components of the Antarctic Treaty System. Section IV describes relevant
provisions of existing bilateral and multilateral agreements pertaining to
offshore oil and gas exploitation in the Arctic and the most relevant principles of international law. Section V critiques the current stance of the
Arctic coastal states as announced in the Ilulissat Declaration, while section VI looks at options for expanding and improving the existing agreements that apply to the Arctic in the scenario where the Arctic coastal
states do not agree to any further legal developments. Section VII recommends a new regime and mechanisms for a regional Arctic agreement if
the Arctic coastal state leaders are persuaded to change their current po-

but instead focuses on the existing and future legal framework for the Arctic. Paul Arthur
Berkman and Oran R. Young recently wrote that the developments in the Arctic (i.e., the
melting sea ice, which has and will expand access to new shipping routes, fisheries, and oil
and gas reserves) “present the international community with a historic opportunity to integrate science and diplomacy.” Paul Arthur Berkman & Oran R. Young, Governance and Environmental Change in the Arctic, 324 SCI. 339, 339 (2009). There are many scientific research
endeavors regarding the Arctic environment and the impacts of climate change that are
currently underway. See, e.g., Scott Polar Research Institute, http://www.spri.cam.ac.uk/;
International Arctic Research Center, http://www.iarc.uaf.edu/; and Arctic Research Consortium of the U.S., http://www.arcus.org/ (which also contains an extensive list of links
to Arctic resources at http://www.arcus.org/arcus/links/index.html).
9. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (2005) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol], available at http://unfccc.
int?Kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php. To date, 189 Parties of the Convention have ratified
this Protocol, and of the Arctic coastal states, the United States is the only non-party. According to the UNFCCC, “[t]he Kyoto Protocol is generally seen as an important first step
towards a truly global emission reduction regime that will stabilize [greenhouse gas] emissions, and provides the essential architecture for any future international agreement on
climate change.” The first commitment period of greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions comes
to an end in 2012, and a new international framework must be negotiated and ratified to
continue reducing global emissions. Id.
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sition. The current Arctic crisis demands the development of a legally
binding regional Arctic marine environment agreement that regulates oil
and gas exploration and exploitation on the Arctic coastal states’ continental shelves.
II. THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND OIL AND
GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE ARCTIC
A. Climate Change Impacts
The Arctic Ocean will be ice-free in the near future, permanently
altering the marine environment and causing the global sea levels to rise.
In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)10
presented its Fourth Assessment Report.11 The IPCC found that the Arctic is especially vulnerable to impacts of climate change—average Arctic
temperatures increased at almost twice the global average rate in the
past 100 years.12 According to the National Snow and Ice Data Center
(NSIDC), in August 2008, “the Arctic Ocean lost more ice than any previous August in the satellite record,” and the September 2008 extent, a
standard measure in the scientific study of Arctic sea ice, was 34 percent
below the long-term average from 1979 to 2000. The result of the 2008
season “strongly reinforces the thirty-year downward trend in Arctic ice
extent.”13 While there is still a debate as to when the entire Arctic Ocean
will be ice-free, a research scientist at NSIDC stated, “The consensus
seems to be among sea ice scientists in the order of 2030.”14 The impact of

10. The IPCC is a scientific body established by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme to authoritatively assess the latest
scientific, technical, and socio-economic literature. See IPCC, Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, Organization, http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.htm (last
visited Mar. 12, 2010).
11. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT (Cambridge University Press 2008), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf. The full report consists of the publications of
the three Working Groups of the IPCC, together with a Synthesis Report.
12. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE WORKING GROUP I, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS—SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 7 (Cambridge
University Press 2008), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/
ar4-wg1-spm.pdf (defining “likelihood” page 3, note 6).
13. Press Release, National Snow and Ice Data Center, Arctic Sea Ice Down to SecondLowest Extent; Likely Record-Low Volume (Oct. 2, 2008), available at http://nsidc.org/
news/press/20081002_seaice_pressrelease.html.
14. Australian Broad. Corp. News, Scientist Warns of Ice-Free Arctic this Generation,
Sept. 17, 2008, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/09/17/2367161.htm.
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climate change in the Arctic has also been documented by nongovernmental organizations (NGO)15 and the Arctic states.16
In 2004, the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) report was
released.17 Three findings in the report18 are particularly relevant to this
article. The first is that the “Arctic climate is now warming rapidly and
much larger changes are projected”; the second is that “Arctic warming
and its consequences have worldwide implications.”19 In particular, the
melting of highly reflective snow and ice cover will lead to greater
warming of the planet and increased glacial melt and river runoff, which
will in turn contribute to rising sea levels and the slowing of the world’s
ocean current circulation system.20 The third finding is relevant to oil and
gas development. ACIA stated that “[r]educed sea ice is very likely to
increase marine transport and access to resources” and is “likely to allow
increased offshore extraction of oil and gas, although increasing ice
movement could hinder some operations.”21 Thus, climate change has
reduced and will continue to reduce Arctic ice-cover, opening up the sea
to more and more development.
Climate change will also have substantial impacts on the Arctic
environment and species. For example, in a controversial move, the U.S.
15. See WWF INTERNATIONAL ARCTIC PROGRAMME, ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT SCIENCE:
AN UPDATE SINCE ACIA (Martin Sommerkorn & Neil Hamilton eds., 2008), available at
http://assets.panda.org/downloads/final_climateimpact_22apr08.pdf. The author would
like to recognize WWF’s extensive and valuable research and work on Arctic issues. In
1992, this NGO started its International Arctic Programme, which seeks to combat threats
to the Arctic and preserve the Arctic’s rich biodiversity in a sustainable way. Over the past
16 years, WWF has developed and produced many credible reports. This article references
several WWF reports. Unfortunately, there are not many other NGOs working specifically
on Arctic issues. See generally WWF, The Arctic, http://www.panda.org/arctic (last visited
Mar. 12, 2010).
16. See ACIA, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC: ARCTIC CLIMATE
IMPACT ASSESSMENT (Cambridge University Press 2004) [hereinafter ACIA, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY], available at http://www.amap.no/acia.
17. See ACIA, Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, http://www.acia.uaf.edu (last visited Mar. 12, 2010).
18. The report, implemented by two Arctic Council working groups—Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) and Carbon Finance and Funds (CFF)—along
with an NGO—the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC)—“is a comprehensively
researched, fully referenced, and independently reviewed evaluation of arctic climate
change and its impact for the region and for the world.” ACIA, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra
note 16, at Preface.
19. Id. at 10.
20. ROB HUEBERT & BROOKS B. YEAGER, WWF, A NEW SEA: THE NEED FOR A REGIONAL
AGREEMENT ON MANAGEMENT AND CONSERVATION OF THE ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRONMENT 6
(2008), available at http://assets.panda.org/downloads/a_new_sea_jan08_final_11jan08.
pdf.
21. ACIA, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 16, at 11.
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Fish and Wildlife Service listed the polar bear as a threatened species
under the Endangered Species Act because sea ice melt is causing a decline in the species range and habitat.22 Overall, it is expected that vegetation zones will shift, causing ecosystem-scale changes to the Arctic
affecting species migration, breeding behavior, and foraging ecology,
and leading to the introduction of invasive species.23
Arctic coastal and indigenous communities are on the frontlines of
climate change. There are approximately four million people living in the
Arctic.24 Climate change, which is causing the melting of permafrost and
coastal erosion, may damage the infrastructure of this region. The health,
water supply, and local economies will also be impacted.25 Indigenous
peoples, whose lives are closely connected with the Arctic environment,
have called climate change a “crisis.”26 Following an adaptation workshop organized by the Arctic Council (a high-level intergovernmental forum), the Council’s Indigenous Peoples Secretariat (representatives of
Indigenous Peoples from across the Arctic) called on “[g]overnments to
work with them in tackling the ‘catastrophic’ effects of Climate
Change.”27 Bill Erasmus, representing the Arctic Athabaskan Council in
Canada, said, “[t]he permafrost is melting, homes are destroyed, rivers
are rising, lakes are disappearing, migratory patterns are changing, [and]
seasons are not the same anymore.”28 Inaction by governments such as
the United States is considered by some to be a violation of human
rights.29 It is clear that the impact of climate change on Arctic peoples
and communities is devastating and threatening traditional ways of
life.30
22. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Threatened Status for the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) Throughout Its Range, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,212 (May
15, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
23. Potts, supra note 3, at 169.
24. ACIA, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 16, at 6.
25. Potts, supra note 3, at 169.
26. See Arctic Peoples: Indigenous Peoples at the Arctic Council, Adaptation Workshop September 20–21, http://ips.arcticportal.org/news/item/175-adaptation-workshopseptember-20-21 (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See generally Randall S. Abate, Climate Change, the United States, and the Impacts of
Arctic Melting: A Case Study in the Need for Enforceable International Environmental Human
Rights, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 3, 7 (2007) (“On December 7, 2005, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) filed a petition with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the
Organization of American States (OAS), accusing the U.S. government of violating their
human rights by fueling global warming.”).
30. Patricia Cochran & Taito Nakalevu, Stopping the Slow Wave of Destruction, ARCTIC
PEOPLES: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AT THE ARCTIC COUNCIL, Dec. 6, 2007, http://
ips.arcticportal.org/news/item/161-stopping-the-slow-wave-of-destruction.
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The impacts of climate change on the Arctic will reverberate
throughout the globe in the form of sea level rise. According to a recent
U.S. government assessment, “[s]ustained warming of at least a few degrees (more than approximately 4° to 13°F above average 20th century
values) is likely to be sufficient to cause the nearly complete, eventual
disappearance of the Greenland ice sheet, which would raise sea level by
several meters.”31 Sea level rise will cause coastal flooding with the potential to adversely impact the lives of 600 million people living in low
lying areas.32 New oil and gas exploration and exploitation will further
increase stress on the already fragile and damaged Arctic environment.
B. Oil and Gas Exploration and Exploitation Impacts
The Arctic is in danger of being sacrificed to meet the insatiable
global demand for oil and gas. Countries and oil companies are continually considering less-accessible supplies to meet increasing demand for
oil and gas. The Arctic, with its potential abundance of those natural
resources, now symbolizes, at least for the oil industry, “the final frontier
for hydrocarbon development.”33 Several major oil companies are already investing in the region. Statoil is preparing to implement its coldweather technologies in the Barents Sea, while Royal Dutch Shell, ExxonMobil, and ConocoPhillips also have interests.34 This economic boom
will come at a potentially severe environmental cost to the Arctic.
There are four main stages of oil and gas development—geological and geophysical survey, exploration, development and production,
and decommissioning35—and each stage involves various activities with
associated environmental impacts.36 The development and production

31. Press Release, U.S. Geological Survey, Glacier and Ice-Sheet Melting, Sea-Ice Retreat and Coastal Erosion Expected as a Result (Jan. 16, 2009), available at http://www.
usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=2109&from=rss_home; see also, U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE
SCIENCE PROGRAM & SUBCOMMITTEE ON GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH, PAST CLIMATE VARIABILITY AND CHANGE IN THE ARCTIC AND AT HIGH LATITUDES: FINAL REPORT, SYNTHESIS AND ASSESSMENT PRODUCT 1.2 (Jan. 16, 2009), available at http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/
sap/sap1-2/default.php.
32. Rising Sea Levels Set to Have Major Impacts Around the World, SCI.DAILY (Mar. 11,
2009), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/03/090310104742.htm.
33. WWF, The Arctic, Threats, http://www.worldwildlife.org/what/wherewework/
arctic/threats.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2010) [hereinafter WWF Arctic].
34. Steve Hargreaves, The Arctic: Oil’s Last Frontier, CNN MONEY, Oct. 25, 2006, http:/
/money.cnn.com/2006/09/27/news/economy/arctic_drilling/index.htm.
35. STALISLAV PATIN, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY
53 (Elena Cascio trans., EcoMonitor Publishing NY 1999).
36. The stages are comprised of: (1) geological and geophysical survey (seismosurveys, test drilling, and so on); (2) exploration (rig emplacement, exploratory drilling,
plugging the well, and others); (3) development and production (platform emplacement,
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stage causes the “most intense and diverse environmental impacts.”37
The associated impacts may include, among other things, physical disturbances, construction and operational discharges, interference with
fisheries, accidental spillage, operational emissions, and disruption of
marine birds and other organisms.38 Power generation, flaring, well testing, leakage of volatile petroleum components, supply activities, and
shuttle transportation emit gases into the air. The air emissions affect the
climate, cause acidification on nearby land, and contribute to emissions
of any number of hazardous substances.39 Discharges of drill cuttings
and muds40 along with associated oil and chemicals used during the development and production phase have negative impacts on sea floor
flora and fauna and reduce both their abundance and diversity.41
Oil spills and pollution can occur at any stage. Spills occur due to
well blowouts during subsea exploration or production, acute or slow
releases from sub-sea pipelines, releases from on-land storage tanks or
pipelines that travel to water, or accidents involving oil transportation
vessels or vessels carrying large quantities of fuel oil.42 Because the
changing sea ice conditions resulting from climate change create more
opportunities for oil and gas exploration and production, there is an enhanced probability of oil spills occurring from offshore platforms, pipelines, storage tanks, and shipping activities.43 Newly opened navigation
routes will be exposed to oil spill risks for the first time. Existing routes
will see an increase of vessel traffic over a longer navigational season,
increasing the existing risk of oil spills.44
The Arctic’s unique climatic conditions—“dynamic ice cover, low
temperatures, reduced visibility or complete darkness, high winds, and
extreme storms”45—impact the effectiveness of spill response and

pipe laying, and drilling; hydrocarbon extraction, separation, and transportation; well and
pipeline maintenance; and so forth); and (4) decommissioning (disassembling, structural
removal, well plugging, and others). Id. at 54.
37. Id. at 57.
38. Id. at 55 tbl.6.
39. ARCTIC COUNCIL, PROTECTION OF THE ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRONMENT (PAME), ARCTIC OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS GUIDELINES § 1.5 (Oct. 10, 2002) [hereinafter PAME Guidelines],
available at http://old.pame.is/sidur/uploads/ArcticGuidelines.pdf.
40. PATIN, supra note 35, at 55 tbl.6.
41. Id. at 71.
42. See id. at 53–111.
43. NUKA RESEARCH AND PLANNING GROUP, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, OIL SPILL RESPONSE
CHALLENGES IN ARCTIC WATERS 7 (2008) [hereinafter WWF, OIL SPILL RESPONSE CHALLENGES], available at http://assets.panda.org/downloads/nuka_oil_spill_response_report_
final_jan_08.pdf.
44. Id.
45. Id.

R

\\server05\productn\N\NMN\49-3-4\NMN3403.txt

834

unknown

Seq: 10

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

26-MAY-10

16:06

[Vol. 49

cleanup. Arctic marine waters have lower temperatures and lower salinity profiles, which inhibit the effectiveness of cleanup operations because
oil may persist longer in these conditions as it evaporates slowly and can
be trapped by sea ice.46 An example of such lingering oil is seen after the
1989 Exxon Valdez disaster in Alaska’s Prince William Sound; six years
after the spill, “oil was found only slightly weathered under the beaches
across the spill impact area.”47 Similar to oil, gas rigs and pipelines also
leak, but gas spills are handled differently than oil because gas is likely
to evaporate before containment or recovery is achieved.48 Despite this
difference in treatment, gas leaks still cause damage to the marine
ecosystem.
Oil and gas development also has indirect impacts, such as the
opening up of new areas to other types of development, further increasing environmental impacts. New infrastructure “dramatically lowers the
barriers to entry for other kinds of resource exploitation.”49 The infrastructure may open up access to “logging of sensitive timberline forests,
commercial fisheries, mining and other commercial use of wild species.”
While oil and gas exploration and exploitation on the Arctic
coastal states’ continental shelves will occur far from local human populations, Arctic communities and peoples are nonetheless far from immune to the impacts caused by the exploration and exploitation. Positive
impacts may include income from oil leasing royalties and oil industryrelated employment opportunities filtering to local communities, thus
improving living standards and access to essential services. However,
exploration and exploitation may also adversely affect the lifestyles of
indigenous peoples.50 For example, indigenous peoples’ right to marine
resources, such as fisheries, may conflict with offshore oil and gas activities.51 Discharges from offshore oil and gas activities and oil spills
threaten the Arctic flora and fauna on which Arctic communities and
indigenous peoples depend.52 While this article primarily looks at the
need for Arctic marine environmental protection, the importance of protecting Arctic communities and indigenous peoples from the negative
side effects of oil and gas development should not be discounted.

46. Id.
47. Id. at 8.
48. Id. at 5 n.1.
49. WWF Arctic, supra note 33.
50. PAME Guidelines, supra note 39, § 1.5.
51. Rune S. Fjellheim & John B. Henriksen, Oil and Gas Exploitation on Arctic Indigenous
Peoples’ Territories: Human Rights, International Law and Corporate Social Responsibility, 4
GÁLDU ÈÁLA: J. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RTS. 1, 31 (2006).
52. PAME Guidelines, supra note 39, § 3.1.
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With full knowledge of the potential perilous impacts of oil and
gas development and the current stress the Arctic environment is under
due to climate change, the Arctic coastal states have declared that existing arrangements—some developed before anyone ever imagined that
the Arctic Ocean would be ice-free—will sufficiently protect the Arctic
environment and people. With the impacts of global climate change and
new and expanded oil and gas development as a backdrop, this article
now turns to the relevant laws applicable to the Arctic.
III. ARCTIC SOFT LAW ARRANGEMENTS VS. ANTARCTIC
HARD LAW REGIME
Each source of international law varies in its status, which in turn
influences the rights and obligations of states.53 The Arctic is primarily
53. According to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, international law
“consists of rules and principles of general application dealing with the conduct of states
and of international organizations and with their relations inter se, as well as with some of
their relations with persons, whether natural or juridical.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 101 (1987). Public International Law governs the activities of governments in relation to other governments. States and international and intergovernmental
organizations create international law. Id. § 101 cmts. c–d. Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice is “generally regarded as a complete statement of the sources
of international law.” IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (7th ed.
2008). Article 38 states:
(1) The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
(b) recognized by the contesting states’
(c) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
(d) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations
(e) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
(2) This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex
aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1031 (June 26, 1985). Thus,
international conventions, agreements, treaties, customary law, general principles of law,
and secondary sources, such as judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists, constitute international law. See BROWNLIE, supra note 53. Ian Brownlie explains that there are four elements of custom: (1) duration, (2) uniformity, (3) generality of
the practice, and (4) opinio juris necessitatis. Id. at 7–8. The fourth element translates to mean
that “nations believe that international law (rather than moral obligation) mandates the
conduct or practice.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). An example of a customary
law is the duty to prevent transboundary harm (also known as the “no harm” principle).
States are not allowed “to conduct or permit activities within their territories, or common
spaces, without regard for the rights of other states or for the protection of the environ-
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governed by soft law (not legally binding) arrangements, while its polar
counterpart, the Antarctic, is governed by a hard law (legally binding)
regime. There are many factors that contribute to this difference between
the governance of the Arctic and Antarctic. The two factors that are of
particular importance in this article are that the Arctic coastal states have
sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction to explore and exploit oil
and gas on their continental shelves, and that the status of the Arctic
coastal states’ continental shelves is currently unknown (see section V).
In contrast, no states can exercise jurisdiction and control in the
Antarctic. Despite this critical difference, the Antarctic may provide valuable lessons for the development of governance in the Arctic.
A. Arctic Soft Law Instruments
Legally binding international treaties to explicitly manage the
Arctic have remained elusive because of the Arctic coastal states’ insistence on maintaining their sovereignty and sovereign rights.54 To date,

ment.” PATRICIA BIRNIE & ALAN BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 104 (2d
ed. 2002).
54. The reader should keep in mind the intricacies of the international law so as to
understand why the existing instruments that apply to oil and gas exploration and exploitation on the Arctic coastal states’ continental shelves will not sufficiently protect the
Arctic marine environment. Treaties (a type of hard law) serve as the most frequent
method of creating binding international environmental rules. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note
53, at 13. A treaty can be a written or oral agreement between states or between states and
international organizations, governed by international law. The 1969 Vienna Convention
on the Law of the Treaties codifies rules, such as entry into force, reservations, interpretation, and invalidity applicable to written treaties. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), Jan. 27, 1989, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. The Convention is not universally ratified;
e.g., the United States has not ratified the treaty. Yet, it is believed that the Convention
codified the customary international law of treaties, thus applicable to both parties and
non-parties. See East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 214 (June 30, 1995). Fundamentally, treaties are consensual. ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS 183
(2008). Thus, treaties “do not ipso facto bind third states, unless the intention to do so is
clearly expressed and the state concerned expressly accepts the benefits or obligations in
question” in writing. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 53, at 13. However, treaties may contain
provisions which are in effect binding on all states not because of treaty status but because
they restate what is already custom. Id. at 14. Also treaty provisions may provide for new
rules, which could develop into customary international law over time through state practice and opinio juris. Id. Under international environmental law, treaties developed through
multilateral processes “promote lawmaking insofar as the instruments they adopt become
generally binding, are translated into customary international law, or evidence general
principles of law.” ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
210 (2007). However, not all treaties lay down strictly binding rules. A current trend in the
environmental arena is to create “framework” treaties that provide for very general requirements for states “‘to take all measures’ or enact ‘all practicable means’” thus requiring states to take further action, such as the conclusion of more specific agreements, the
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only a package of soft law mechanisms coordinates the states in regards
to each state’s treatment of the Arctic area.55 In 1989, the Arctic states
began to work together to combat threats to the Arctic ecosystem “which
could not be addressed by each acting alone,”56 resulting in the adoption
of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). The objective of
AEPS is “to ensure the protection of the Arctic environment and its sustainable and equitable development, while protecting the cultures of indigenous peoples.”57 As its name indicates, AEPS is not a legally binding
instrument, yet it does contain commitments.
Five years after Arctic states adopted AEPS, the Arctic Council, a
high-level intergovernmental forum, was established to coordinate the
Arctic states’ activities in the region and the programs established under
AEPS.58 The Council’s members include the eight Arctic states (Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United
States), permanent participants (the indigenous peoples), and those with
observer status (namely non-Arctic states, as well as global and regional
intergovernmental, inter-parliamentary, and nongovernmental organizations).59 The Arctic Council is required to make decisions by consensus of
its members60 and meets biennially at the ministerial level.61 The Council
Chair and Secretariat rotate every two years among the Arctic states.62
The Council’s work is subdivided into working groups, including the

addition of protocols or annexes, or even the adoption of nonbinding guidelines or recommendations. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 53, at 14. One other form of a treaty worth mentioning is a regulatory treaty. A regulatory treaty can take the same shape as an umbrella or
framework and link to protocols that entail specific duties, e.g., the 1976 Barcelona Convention on the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea requires states to ratify at least one of the
accompanying protocols, such as cooperation in combating oil spills or the dumping of
wastes. Id. Thus, treaties may include both binding and nonbinding rules. Soft law, on the
other hand, is nonbinding per se, but could potentially be law-making in the same way as
treaties, by expressing already recognized customary law or general principles. BOYLE &
CHINKIN, supra note 54, at 212. The term soft law is a “convenient description for a variety
of non-legally binding instruments used in contemporary international relations,” including, but not limited to, inter-state conference declarations (like the 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development), United Nations General Assembly instruments, interpretative guidance by international institutions, codes of conduct, and especially important in
this article, guidelines and recommendations by international organizations. Id. at 212–13.
55. See generally SANDS, supra note 2, at 534–36.
56. Id.
57. Id. (quoting the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS)).
58. Id. (citing Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, Sept. 19, 1996, 35
I.L.M. 1382 (1996)).
59. Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, cls. 2–3.
60. Id. cl. 7.
61. Id. cl. 4.
62. Id. cl. 5.
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Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP),63 the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG),64 and the Protection of the
Arctic Marine Environment (PAME).65
In 2002, the PAME working group revised its Arctic Offshore Oil
and Gas Guidelines. The starting point of the Guidelines is that “Arctic
petroleum activities will be conducted in compliance with applicable international law.”66 The Guidelines’ purposes are: to be of use to Arctic
national authorities in conducting offshore oil and gas activities; to secure common policies and practices; to support industry when planning
activities; and to inform the public about environmental impacts of oil
and gas development.67 The Guidelines are nonbinding and meant to encourage Arctic states to implement the highest standards available. Section 1.3 of the Guidelines lays out the general principles for Arctic
offshore drilling, which include the precautionary principle, the polluter
pays principle, and sustainable development principles. The Guidelines
prescribe various procedures such as environmental impact assessments
(EIA).68 They also contain measures aimed at protecting Arctic communities and indigenous peoples, promoting sustainability and conservation
of flora and fauna,69 and providing for safety and environmental management,70 monitoring,71 operating practices,72 emergencies procedures,73
and decommissioning and site clearance.74 The working group’s efforts
have generally been aimed at the study and survey of current activities
relating to shipping and offshore oil and gas75 rather than looking at future activities such as oil and gas drilling in formerly ice-covered areas
on the Arctic coastal states’ continental shelves.

63. See Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, http://www.amap.no (last
visited June 11, 2008).
64. See Sustainable Development Working Group, The Arctic Council, http://portal.
sdwg.org (last visited June 11, 2008).
65. See Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), http://arcticportal.org/
en/pame (last visited June 11, 2008).
66. PAME Guidelines, supra note 39, § 1.1.
67. Id. §1.2.
68. Id. § 2.
69. Id. § 3.
70. Id. § 4.
71. Id. § 5.
72. PAME Guidelines, supra note 39, § 6.
73. Id. § 7.
74. Id. § 8.
75. David VanderZwaag, Rob Huebert & Stacey Ferrara, The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Arctic Council and Multilateral Environmental Initiatives: Tinkering While the
Arctic Marine Environment Totters, 30 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 131, 150 (2001).
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Another example of regional Arctic cooperation based on nonbinding agreements is the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, consisting of the
Barents Euro-Arctic Council and Barents Regional Council. Since the Barents region was an area of military confrontation during the Cold War,
the objective of the organization is to promote sustainable development
through close cooperation to secure long-term stability and reduce potential tensions. Russia, as the Chair of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council
from November 2007 through November 2009, was tasked with guiding
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the European Commission in achieving sustainable development in the region.76
AEPS, the Arctic Council and its associated working groups, and
the Barents Euro-Arctic Region are based on nonbinding documents, not
treaties.77 The lack of coordination of these arrangements raises the question of whether the system currently in place is capable of responding to
the challenges facing the Arctic.78 Philippe Sands, an expert in the field of
international law, wrote:
The adoption of the Arctic Environmental Protection
Strategy provides a useful opportunity to develop new legal
arrangements and institutions to govern an ecosystem which
transcends national boundaries and requires international cooperation for its adequate protection to be assured. The soft
law approach it currently envisages provides a first step; ultimately it will be necessary to establish appropriate institutional
arrangements and substantive rules, perhaps similar to those applied in the Antarctic, to ensure agreed obligations are
respected and enforced.79

Upon the adoption of AEPS in 1989, no one could foresee the extent of the melting of Arctic ice and the resulting opportunities for natural resource extraction. The loose Arctic arrangement made sense at the
time because the Arctic was isolated, relatively inaccessible, and its
wealth of natural resources was unknown. As the ice cover recedes and
access to new resource becomes available, a hard law regime is necessary
to protect the Arctic marine environment.

76. Barents Euro-Arctic Region, Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, http:/
/www.beac.st/?Deptid=25866 (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
77. See VanderZwaag, Huebert & Ferrara, supra note 75, at 142–43.
78. Id. at 142.
79. SANDS, supra note 2, at 731 (emphasis added).
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B. Antarctic Hard Law Regime
The Arctic soft law arrangements starkly contrast with the
Antarctic hard law regime. The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) comprises
“tightly linked components” of hard law.80 Unlike the Arctic, the
Antarctic is “part of the global commons and not subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of any state.”81 Yet, there are some components of the ATS
worth describing because their mechanisms may provide the blueprints
for designing a future Arctic regime containing rules to prevent the negative impacts of increased offshore oil and gas development.
Antarctica is the only continent and region managed by a single
international regime82—the ATS—and has been described as a “world
order miracle.”83 The major components of the ATS are the 1959
Antarctic Treaty, the 1972 Antarctic Seals Convention, the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
(CCAMLR), and the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection of the
Arctic Treaty (Protocol). Furthermore, the 1988 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources Activities (CRAMRA), while not in
force due to strong and successful opposition by key governments and
NGOs seeking complete protection of the Antarctic region, remains relevant because of its proposal to create an institutional body to oversee
extractive activities in a sensitive polar ecosystem.
The Antarctic Treaty freezes national claims to sovereignty on the
continent.84 Facially, this treaty is not an environmental agreement, but it
can be seen to have a positive effect on the environment.85 Of the 45 participating states, 28 countries are consultative parties empowered with
the right to vote. To become a consultative party, a state must “demon-

80. ORAN R. YOUNG, INSTITUTE OF ARCTIC STUDIES, DARTMOUTH COLLEGE, ARCTIC GOVPREPARING FOR THE NEXT PHASE 5 (2002), available at www.arcticparl.org/_res/
site/File/images/conf5_scpar20021.pdf (commissioned by the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region in preparation for a discussion of the future of Arctic
governance).
81. SANDS, supra note 2, at 710.
82. Linda Nowlan, Arctic Legal Regime for Environmental Protection 41 (IUCN Environmental Law Programme, Working Paper No. 44, 2001) (citing DONALD ROTHWELL, THE POLAR REGIONS AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (1996)).
83. Nowlan, supra note 82, at 41 (citing Richard Falk, The Antarctic Treaty System: Are
There Viable Alternatives?, in THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM IN WORLD POLITICS 399 (Arnfinn
Jorgensen-Dahl & Willy Ostreng eds., 1991). According to Nowlan, “[c]ommentators are of
the view that ATS represents a model for international environmental law.” Id. at 351 (citing ROTHWELL, supra note 82).
84. SANDS, supra note 2, at 712.
85. Id. at 712–13.
ERNANCE:
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strate a commitment to the Antarctic through the conduct of significant
and qualified scientific research.”86
CRAMRA created the Antarctic Mineral Resources Commission.
If the Convention had come into force, this Commission would have
played an essential role in determining where extraction could take
place, the regulation of such activities, the adoption of protective measures, and the facilitation of EIAs. It would have been given the ultimate
authority to review security of the Antarctic environment in the interest of
all mankind.87 CRAMRA also would have required decisions on mineral
resource extraction to be based on the availability of adequate information and on the precautionary principle. In addition, mineral resource
extraction would have been prohibited unless it was “judged . . . that
the activity in question would not cause environmental harm.”88 Fortunately, for conservation purposes, the Antarctic Treaty parties rejected
CRAMRA and instead supported a new broad-ranging set of environmental protection measures.
The 1991 Protocol bans all aspects of Antarctic mineral resource
exploration and exploitation except for scientific purposes.89 The Protocol
created the Committee on Environmental Protection to implement the
agreement, similar to CRAMRA’s Commission.90 At the request of any
Antarctic Treaty consultative party, a review conference can be held 50
years after the Protocol was entered in force.91 Modifications and amendments to the Protocol can be adopted at the review conference as long as
“a majority of the Parties [to the Protocol], including three quarters of the
States which are Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties at the time of
adoption of this Protocol” agree.92 Finally, any modification or amendment to the ban on mineral resource activities must include a “binding
legal regime” that protects the interests of states under the Antarctic
Treaty and defines “under which conditions, any such activities would
be acceptable.”93 Another relevant aspect of the Protocol is its extensive
86. British Antarctic Survey, Natural Environment Research Council, Antarctic Treaty,
Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.antarctica.ac.uk/about_antarctica/geopolitical/
treaty/faq.php (last visited Feb. 19, 2010). Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, The
Antarctic Treaty, Article IX, www.scar.org/treaty/at_text.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2010).
87. Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources Activities, arts. 18,
21, June 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 859, available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/15282.
BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 53, at 214.
88. SANDS, supra note 2, at 717.
89. Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, art. 7, Oct. 4, 1991, 30
I.L.M. 1455 [hereinafter 1991 Protocol].
90. Id. arts. 11–12.
91. Id. art. 25(2).
92. 1991 Protocol, supra note 89, art. 25(3).
93. Id. art. 25(5)(a).
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EIA requirements under Annex I, which impose stringent standards on
activities having more than a “minor or transitory impact.”94
While components of the ATS may provide the architects of a future Arctic regime with governance ideas particular to a polar setting,
geopolitical differences between the Arctic and the Antarctic (see section
V) prevent the crossing over of legal mechanisms. If the Arctic coastal
states put aside their political and economic differences, a temporary ban
on resource extraction such as the moratorium in the 1991 Protocol might
be possible. Or, if a temporary ban is too far-reaching, then the states
might consider forming a regulating body, such as the Antarctic Mineral
Resource Commission created under CRAMRA, which would be tasked
with overseeing responsible and cautious development of Arctic oil and
gas resources. However, before broaching the subject of systemic
changes to Arctic governance, the existing international agreements and
principles pertaining to the Arctic are described below.
IV. EXISTING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND
PRINCIPLES PERTAINING TO THE ARCTIC
There are six relevant multilateral and bilateral instruments that
currently regulate oil and gas exploration and exploitation on the continental shelves of the Arctic Ocean’s coastal states or contain provisions
for the protection of the Arctic marine environment against harm caused
by such activities. Discussed first are two of the existing agreements—
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment in the NorthEast Atlantic (OSPAR). These agreements are the most relevant because
UNCLOS provides a general framework for governing the oceans and
OSPAR is a protective and effective convention that covers some of the
Arctic waters. Next, two widely ratified treaties—the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78) and
the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response,
and Co-operation (OPRC)—are discussed. Following is a discussion of
the remaining two agreements between two or more states—the 1983 Canada-Denmark Agreement for Cooperation Relating to the Marine Environment (1983 Agreement) and the 1993 Agreement Between Denmark,
Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden Concerning Cooperation Measures to Deal with Pollution of the Sea by Oil or Other Harmful Substances (1993 Agreement). Only the provisions of the agreements that are
directly applicable to the oil and gas exploration and exploitation on the
Arctic coastal states’ continental shelves are discussed. In addition to
94. Id. Annex I, art. 1.
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these explicit agreements, several principles of international law are relevant in analyzing Arctic governance. In their totality, the agreements, the
principles of international law, and the Arctic soft law arrangements discussed in section III(A) represent the baseline protection for the Arctic
marine environment against the impacts of oil and gas exploration and
exploitation. Options for expanding and improving the existing agreements are presented in section VI.
A. UNCLOS
UNCLOS was created as the “comprehensive constitution for the
oceans”95 because it provides the framework for most uses of the ocean,96
including offshore oil and gas extraction. The primary functions of UNCLOS are: to define maritime zones that divide jurisdictional responsibilities amongst coastal, flag, and port states; to protect the marine
environment; to preserve freedom of navigation; and to provide guidelines for the use of marine resources. There are 160 parties to UNCLOS
and of the five Arctic coastal states, only the United States97 has not acceded to the Convention. The Convention is organized by maritime
zones (also referred to as regimes) and it details the rights and obligations within each maritime zone.98 Oil and gas development on the continental shelf generally falls under the continental shelf regime and the
exclusive economic zones (EEZ).
The Arctic coastal states’ rights and obligations to their continental shelves differ within its 200-nautical-mile (nm) zone and beyond this
zone. Within the 200-nm zone, the continental shelf regime and the EEZ
coexist.99 A coastal state must claim a 200-nm EEZ.100 Even if an EEZ is

95. TOMMY T.B. KOH, PRESIDENT OF THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA, REMARKS, A CONSTITUTION FOR THE OCEANS 1 (Dec. 10, 1982), http://www.
un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/koh_english.pdf.
96. R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 19 (2d ed. 1985).
97. United Nations, Table Recapitulating the Status of the Convention and of the Related Agreements, as at 1 January 2010, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/
status2010.pdf; see generally Andrew King, Thawing a Frozen Treaty: Protecting United States
Interests in the Arctic with a Congressional-Executive Agreement on the Law of the Sea, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 329, 334 (2007).
98. The zones comprise: territorial sea and contiguous zone (part II); straits used for
international navigation (part III); archipelagic states (part IV); exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) (part V); continental shelf (part VI); high seas (part VII); regime of islands (part VIII);
enclosed or semi-enclosed seas (part IX); right of access of landlocked states to and from
the sea and freedom of transit (part X); and the area (part XI). United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS], available at
www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.
99. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 96, at 119.
100. Id. at 137.
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not claimed, a state will still have rights to its continental shelf. These
rights are limited to the exploration of the shelf and the exploitation of its
natural resources because the continental shelf is “not regarded as part of
the territory of the coastal state.”101 Oil and gas are included in the definition of natural resources,102 and the coastal states can construct and authorize drilling on their own continental shelf.103 The rights are
exclusive—a third-party state must gain the approval of the coastal state
before embarking on any activity on the continental shelf.104 Further, the
coastal state may implement its own offshore oil and gas laws and regulations including licensing and permitting.105 In places where oil and gas
reserves overlap on the continental shelves of two or more states, arrangements can be made for joint regulation and exploitation of the
cross-boundary resources.106
A coastal state may cause only limited interference with freedom
of navigation when exercising its rights to explore or exploit the continental shelf.107 Because articles 60 and 80 of UNCLOS expressly permit
offshore drilling platforms, it can be inferred that the platforms themselves are not an “unjustifiable interference” to navigation or other rights
and freedoms.108 Safety zones of 500 meters around the platforms are
also permitted.109 However, these safety zones must not interfere with
the “use of recognised sea lanes essential to international navigation.”110
Once an oil and gas field is exhausted, at the very least, the structures
need to be partially removed and due regard must be given to ensure
safety in navigation, fishing, and protection of the marine environment.
Also the depth, position, and dimensions of the remaining structures
must be publicized.111 As a framework convention of international law,
UNCLOS directs states to take “into account any generally accepted international standards established in this regard by the competent international organization.” Thus, coastal states are to follow standards set by
organizations, such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO),112
101. Id. at 119.
102. UNCLOS, supra note 98, pt. VI, art. 77(4).
103. Id. pt. V, art. 60, pt. VI, arts. 80–81.
104. Id. pt. VI, art. 77(2).
105. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 96, at 119–20.
106. Id. at 118.
107. UNCLOS, supra note 98, pt. VI, art. 78.
108. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 96, at 153–54; UNCLOS, supra note 98, art. 78(2).
109. UNCLOS, supra note 98, art. 60.
110. Id. art. 60(7); CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 96, at 153–54.
111. UNCLOS, supra note 98, art. 60(3).
112. The IMO is the United Nations’ specialized agency responsible for improving maritime safety and preventing pollution from ships. See International Maritime Organization,
http://www.imo.org/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2008).
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or other agreements that contain substantive provisions regulating oil
and gas activities, such as MARPOL 73/78 (as discussed further in section IV).
A coastal state’s rights to oil and gas exploration and exploitation
are different beyond the 200-nm zone. Because these superadjacent waters are considered the high seas, only the continental shelf regime applies.113 Sedentary minerals, including oil and gas, remain under the
exclusive control of the coastal state; however, oil and gas extraction will
be subject to additional regulations. After the first five years of exploitation, a coastal state must pay a proportion of the value or volume of
production at the site through114 the International Seabed Authority. The
amount increases from 1 percent in the sixth year to 7 percent in the
twelfth and following years. This money is to be given to developing
states—particularly those least developed and landlocked—as “a kind of
quid pro quo for the diminution of the resources of the International Sea
Bed Area consequent upon allowing jurisdiction over the shelf beyond
the 200-mile limit.”115
Although it is unclear, the provisions under part IX of UNCLOS
(regarding enclosed or semi-enclosed seas) may apply to Arctic coastal
states. It is a “vexed question of whether the Arctic Ocean is a semi-enclosed sea over which Arctic coastal States are vested with special rights
and duties of cooperation, as provided for in Articles 122 and 123” of
UNCLOS.116 Assuming that it is ultimately found that semi-enclosed seas
provisions do apply to the Arctic Ocean, article 123(b) would require the
Arctic coastal states to endeavour, directly or through an appropriate regional organization, “to coordinate the implementation of their rights
and duties with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine
environment.”117 Arctic coastal states would then be obliged “to invite, as
appropriate, . . . States or international organizations to cooperate with
them in the furtherance” of protecting and preserving the marine environment.118 The Arctic Council “might be seen as a precursor to a more
formalized assertion of a collective jurisdictional claim over the entire
Arctic Ocean by the Arctic States.”119 These part IX UNCLOS provisions
may implicate how the Arctic coastal states are to protect the marine
environment, while also permitting oil and gas activities on their continental shelves.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 96, at 156.
The word “through” was intentionally used. See UNCLOS, supra note 98, art. 82(4).
CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 96, at 157.
Rayfuse, supra note 2, at 210; Potts, supra note 3, at 151.
UNCLOS, supra note 98, art. 123(b).
Id. art. 123(d).
Rayfuse, supra note 2, at 210.
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UNCLOS also contains provisions for marine environmental protection. Only article 234 is directly relevant to the future increase of activity in the Arctic region;120 it provides coastal states the right to adopt and
enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations in ice-covered areas
within their EEZ where the conditions present exceptional hazards to
navigation, and where pollution would cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of ecological balance. Such laws must have “due regard”
for navigation and be based on the best available scientific evidence.121
However, this provision only applies to vessels such as oil tankers, and
not oil platforms themselves.
UNCLOS does provide a general framework for environmental
protection under part XII, “Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment,” which applies to all uses including oil and gas exploration
and exploitation on continental shelves. States have the general obligation to “protect and preserve the marine environment.”122 While UNCLOS explicitly provides states with the sovereign right to exploit their
natural resources, states must: (1) ensure that activities undertaken and
pollution originating in their jurisdiction do not cause transboundary
harm;123 (2) cooperate on a regional or global basis, or through competent
international organizations, in “formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with [UNCLOS], for the protection and preservation of the
marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features”;124 (3) notify “competent international organizations” and other
states that are likely to be affected by cases in which the “marine environment is in imminent danger of being damaged or has been damaged
by pollution”;125 (4) cooperate to the best of their ability in “eliminating
the effects of pollution and preventing or minimizing the damage” when
damage has been caused, and “jointly develop and promote contingency
plans for responding to pollution incidents”;126 (5) cooperate in conducting scientific research about pollution of the marine environment
and “acquire knowledge for the assessment of the nature and extent of
pollution, exposure to it, and its pathways, risks and remedies”;127 (6)
monitor activities which they permit or “in which they engage in order
to determine whether these activities are likely to pollute the marine en120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See Huebert & Yeager, supra note 20, at 21.
UNCLOS, supra note 98, art. 234.
Id. art. 192.
Id. arts. 194(2), 195.
Id. art. 197.
Id. art. 198.
Id. art. 199.
UNCLOS, supra note 98, art. 200.
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vironment”;128 and (7) assess the potential effects of such activities on the
marine environment and communicate reports of the results of such assessments to “competent international organizations” when there are
reasonable grounds to believe that planned activities under their jurisdiction or control may cause substantial pollution of, or significant and
harmful changes to, the marine environment.129 Thus, coastal states have
significant obligations under part XII of UNCLOS for the protection and
preservation of the Arctic marine environment, and these obligations
would apply to new offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation in
the Arctic.
Similar to the Arctic coastal states’ rights to authorize or limit
third parties from drilling on their continental shelves, UNCLOS also requires coastal states to adopt laws and regulations to protect the marine
environment from seabed activities.130 The laws must be equally or more
effective “than international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures,”131 and states must “endeavour to harmonize their
policies” at a regional level and among neighboring states.132 It can be
inferred from the Convention’s text that the Arctic coastal states that are
parties to UNCLOS are required, by “acting especially through competent international organizations or diplomatic conference,” to “establish
global and regional rules, standards and recommended practices and
procedures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment,” and that these rules are to be re-examined periodically.133 This
final provision is a clear example of UNCLOS serving as a framework
from which parties are required to participate in international or regional
agreements that provide for more substantive legal obligations.
B. OSPAR
The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment in
the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR) seeks “to prevent and eliminate marine
pollution and to achieve sustainable management of the maritime
area.”134 There are 15 contracting parties to the Convention, as well as the

128. Id. arts. 204(1)–(2).
129. Id. arts. 205–06.
130. Id. art. 208(1).
131. Id. art. 208(3).
132. Id. art. 208(4).
133. UNCLOS, supra note 98, art. 208(5).
134. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, pmbl., Sept. 22, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 1072 [hereinafter OSPAR Convention], available at http:/
/www.ospar.org/html_documents/ospar/html/OSPAR_Convention_e_updated_text_
2007.pdf#nameddest=annex3.
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European Commission.135 Of the Arctic Ocean coastal states, Denmark
and Norway are parties, but Canada, Russia, and the United States are
not. The OSPAR area is a mix of areas within and beyond national jurisdiction and includes “those parts of the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans and
their dependent seas which lie north of 36° north latitude and between
42° west longitude and 51° east longitude.”136 This area is divided into
five regions. Region I, Arctic Waters, constitutes approximately 40 percent of the OSPAR maritime area, and is made of up Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Norway, and Sweden waters.137 Thus, three Arctic states (Finland, Iceland, and Sweden) and two Arctic coastal states (Denmark and
Norway) are members of OSPAR. “[A]ny . . . coastal state bordering the
maritime area”138 or “located upstream on watercourses reaching the
maritime area”139 may join the Convention. Also, “[c]ontracting parties
may unanimously invite [other] States or regional economic integration
organisations . . . to accede the Convention.”140
There are two unique features to OSPAR. First, it formed a regional body to supervise implementation—the OSPAR Commission.141
The Commission is composed of representatives of the contracting parties142 and has a full time Secretariat. It is empowered to adopt binding
decisions, recommendations, and “programmes and measures for the
prevention and elimination of pollution” by controlling activities “which
may, directly and or indirectly, adversely affect the maritime area.”143
Second, OSPAR’s contracting parties are obliged to apply the precautionary principle,144 the polluter pays principle,145 best available techniques, and best environmental practices principles in their programs
and measures.146 Also, the contracted parties are committed to following
an ecosystem approach.147

135. OSPAR Commission, Welcome to the OSPAR Commission, http://www.ospar.
org/eng/html/welcome.html (last visited June 11, 2008).
136. OSPAR Convention, supra note 134, art. 1(a)(i).
137. OSPAR Commission, Region I—Arctic Waters, http://www.ospar.org/content/
content.asp?menu=00420211000000_000000_000000 (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
138. OSPAR Convention, supra note 134, art. 25(b).
139. Id. art. 25(c).
140. Id. art. 27(2).
141. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 53, at 356.
142. OSPAR Convention, supra note 134, art. 10(1).
143. Id. arts. 10(2)–(3).
144. Id. art. 2 (2)(a).
145. Id. art. 2 (2)(b).
146. Id. art. 2 (3).
147. This is not explicitly stated in the Convention. According to the OSPAR Commission, for the purpose of the Convention, the ecosystem approach is defined as:
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OSPAR contains five annexes, of which III and V are relevant to
oil and gas exploration and exploitation. Annex III, the prevention of
pollution from offshore sources, prohibits the dumping of wastes or
other matter from offshore installations.148 It requires contracting parties
to use best available techniques and best environmental practices, including, where appropriate, “clean technology.”149 Each contracting party
is required to establish a competent authority that would authorize and
regulate the use of, or the discharge or emission from, offshore sources
or substances that would reach and affect the maritime area.150 These national authorities are required to establish a system of monitoring and
inspection to assess compliance with authorization or regulations.151 The
national authorities are also in charge of granting permits for allowing
the disposal of offshore installations.152 Annex III plainly states that “no
such permit shall be issued if the disused offshore installation or disused
offshore pipeline contains substances which result or are likely to result
in hazards to human health, harm to living resources and marine ecosystems, damage to amenities or interference with other legitimate uses of
the sea.”153 The Commission has already adopted mandatory measures
limiting pollution from offshore installations.154
Annex V pertains to the protection and conservation of the ecosystems and biological diversity of the maritime area. The parties are to take
“necessary measures to protect the maritime area against the adverse effects of human activities so as to safeguard human health and to conserve marine ecosystems and, when practicable, restore marine areas
which have been adversely affected, as well as their obligations under

The comprehensive integrated management of human activities based on
the best available scientific knowledge about the ecosystem and its dynamics, in order to identify and take action on influences which are critical
to the health of marine ecosystems, thereby achieving sustainable use of
ecosystem goods and services and maintenance of ecosystem integrity.
OSPAR Commission, Principles: Ecosystem Approach, http://www.ospar.org/content/
content.asp?menu=00430109150000_000000_000000 (last visited Oct. 18, 2008) (emphasis
omitted). However, Annex V, article 3(1)(b)(iv), states that it is the duty of the OSPAR
Commission “to aim for the application of an integrated ecosystem approach” when drawing up “programmes and measures for the control of the human activities.” OSPAR Convention, supra note 134, Annex V, art. 3.
148. Id. Annex III, art. 3.
149. Id. Annex III, art. 2.
150. Id. Annex III, art. 4(1).
151. Id. Annex III, art. 4(2).
152. Id. Annex III, art. 5(1).
153. OSPAR Convention, supra note 134, Annex III, art. 5(2).
154. See OSPAR Decision 98/3 on the Disposal of Disused Offshore Installations, available at http://www.ospar.org/documents/DBASE/DECRECS/Decisions/od98-03e.doc.
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the Convention on Biological Diversity.”155 The Annex also requires that
the OSPAR Commission take an “integrated ecosystem approach.”156
Under Annex V, contracting parties intend to create a network of marine
protected areas (MPAs).157 Each contracting party is asked to nominate
areas within its jurisdiction that justify MPA status158 and to report findings to the OSPAR Commission.159 Once listed, the contracting party
must develop a management plan160 and regularly report on the status of
the area.161
The OSPAR Commission has seven work areas. Two of the work
areas are the offshore oil and gas industry and climate change. The Commission has produced the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry Strategy with
the objective of preventing and eliminating pollution from offshore
sources and to protect the OSPAR maritime area against the effects of
such activities so as to safeguard human health, conserve the marine ecosystems, and, “[w]hen practical,” restore marine areas that have been adversely affected.162 The Strategy covers all phases of offshore activities
and sets out the development and implementation of programs and requires the OSPAR Commission “to collect information about threats to
the marine environment; establish priorities for taking action; and develop and periodically review environmental goals.”163 This work is implemented by OSPAR’s Offshore Industry Committee.164 It is important
to note that the Commission does not work in isolation but collaborates
with other international organizations. For example, OSPAR contributes
to “international efforts, including the 1996 Protocol to the Convention
on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter (London Convention, 1972) and efforts by the European Union,
the most relevant being developments under the REACH [Registration,
Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals] Regulations (for
Offshore Chemicals).”165

155. OSPAR Convention, supra note 134, Annex V, art. 2.
156. Id. Annex V, art. 3(1)(b)(iv).
157. See OSPAR Recommendation 2003/3 on a Network of Marine Protected Areas,
available at http://www.ospar.org/documents/dbase/decrecs/recommendations/or0303e.doc.
158. OSPAR Convention, supra note 134, Annex V, art. 3.1(a).
159. Id. Annex V, art. 3.1(b).
160. Id. Annex V, art. 3.3.
161. Id. Annex V, art. 5.
162. OSPAR Commission, Offshore Oil and Gas Industry, http://www.ospar.org/
content/content.asp?menu=00210305000000_000000_000000 (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. OSPAR Commission, Climate Change, http://www.ospar.org/content/content.
asp?menu=00230307000000_000000_000000 (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
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Under the climate change work area, the OSPAR Commission
works with contracting parties to ensure that climate change impacts are
taken into consideration in implementing the OSPAR Convention. Specifically, at the 2007 meeting of the OSPAR Commission, contracting parties highlighted significant national activities considering the impact of
climate change on the marine environment.166 Currently, the Commission’s Assessment and Monitoring Committee is working to establish
ways in which to incorporate climate change impact considerations into
future work. The OSPAR Commission produced a report analyzing “the
main challenges for OSPAR to adapt current policies and objectives for
the protection of the marine environment,” and “assess[ing] the needs
and options to mitigate climate change relevant for OSPAR’s work to
adapt to the consequences of climate change and how this will influence
OSPAR’s future work.”167 Already, a significant portion of the OSPAR
maritime area is Arctic waters, and of all the existing agreements, OSPAR may be the most effective forum for expanded governance and regulation of the Arctic Ocean (see section VII).
C. MARPOL 73/78
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships (MARPOL 73/78) seeks “the complete elimination of intentional
pollution of the marine environment by oil and other harmful substances
and the minimization of accidental discharge of such substances” from
ships.168 All of the Arctic coastal states are parties to MARPOL 73/78.
The Convention contains six technical annexes and all parties are bound
to Annexes I and II.169 Oil and gas exploration and exploitation are regulated by this Convention because a ship is defined as “a vessel of any
type whatsoever operating in the marine environment and includes . . . fixed or floating platforms.”170 The provisions for ships of 400
tons gross tonnage or greater also apply to offshore oil and gas rigs.171 In
general, the Convention’s articles deal with “jurisdiction, powers of en-

166. Id.
167. Id.; see also OSPAR COMMISSION, ASSESSMENT OF CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION AND
ADAPTATION (2009), available at http://www.ospar.org/documents/dbase/publications/
p00464_climate%20change%20mitigation%20adaptation%20final.pdf.
168. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, pmbl., Nov.
2, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78), Feb. 17,
1978, 1340 U.N.T.S. 61 [hereinafter MARPOL 73/78].
169. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 53, at 363.
170. MARPOL 73/78, supra note 168, art. 2(4).
171. Id. Annex I, reg. 21.
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forcement, and inspection,” while its annexes deal with “anti-pollution
regulations” that set technical limits for oil discharges.172
Parties can designate “special areas,”173 also referred to as “particularly sensitive sea areas,” if such areas are considered vulnerable to pollution. Within the “special area,” discharges can be completely
prohibited with minor and well-defined exceptions.174 The Antarctic is a
listed special area,175 while the Arctic is not. Rigs operating in a special
area are prohibited from discharging oil in that area “except when the oil
content of the discharge without dilution does not exceed 15 parts per
million.”176 MARPOL 73/78 applies to oil and gas exploration and exploitation in the Arctic.
D. OPRC
The International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response, and Co-operation (OPRC) requires parties to “prepare for and
respond to an oil pollution incident”177 “involving ships, offshore units,
sea-ports and oil handling facilities.”178 All of the Arctic states are parties
to this Convention.179 There are several state obligations under the OPRC
Convention. Operators of offshore units under the jurisdiction of contracting parties are required to have oil pollution emergency plans or
similar documentation.180 Pollution incidents must be reported to coastal
authorities.181 Parties agree to provide assistance to others in the event of
an oil pollution incident.182 This treaty is relevant to the Arctic because it
directly applies to offshore units and it takes into account the precautionary and polluter pays principles.183 Similar to UNCLOS, the parties are
responsible for ensuring compliance with the Convention’s provision.184

172. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 53, at 362–63.
173. MARPOL 73/78, supra note 168, Annex I, reg. 1(10).
174. Id. Annex I, reg. 1(10).
175. See id. Annexes I, V (as amended Mar. 17, 1992).
176. Id. Annex I, reg. 21(3).
177. International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, art. 1, Nov. 30, 1990, 1891 U.N.T.S. 78. [hereinafter OPRC].
178. Id. pmbl.
179. See International Maritime Organization, Status of Conventions by Countries,
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=248 (last visited Mar. 12,
2010).
180. OPRC, supra note 177, art. 3(2).
181. Id. art. 4(1)(a).
182. Id. art. 7.
183. Id. pmbl.
184. Id. art. 2(6).
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Also, the International Maritime Organization185 plays a supportive role
in facilitating the adoption of regulations,186 reporting,187 cooperation and
collaboration,188 and compliance.189
E. 1983 Canada-Denmark Agreement
The Canada-Denmark Agreement (1983 Agreement) is important
because it demonstrates two Arctic coastal states taking steps to further
their obligations under UNCLOS, in particular with the provisions concerning “ice-covered areas”190 and the prevention, reduction, and control
of pollution of the marine environment.191 A unique duty in the Agreement is the requirement of prior notification by a contracting party of
“any works or undertakings in its area of responsibility which may create a significant risk of pollution”192 to another contracting party whose
area may be affected. It further requires the parties to enter into consultations at the request of the other party on “any works or undertakings”
that create a significant risk of pollution.193 The consultations must be

185. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the United Nations’ specialized
agency responsible for improving maritime safety and preventing pollution from ships.
International Maritime Organization, General Objectives and Policies, http://www.imo.
org/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2008).
186. OPRC, supra note 177, art. 3(1)(a) (“Each Party shall require that ships entitled to
fly its flag have on board a shipboard oil pollution emergency plan as required by and in
accordance with the provisions adopted by the Organization for this purpose.”).
187. Id. art. 4(2) (“Reports under paragraph (1)(a)(i) shall be made in accordance with
the requirements developed by the Organization and based on the guidelines and general
principles adopted by the Organization. Reports under paragraph (1)(a)(ii), (b), (c) and (d)
shall be made in accordance with the guidelines and general principles adopted by the
Organization to the extent applicable.”); id. art. 5(4) (“Parties should use, in so far as practicable, the oil pollution reporting system developed by the Organization when exchanging
information and communicating with other States and with the Organization.”).
188. Id. art. 8(1) (“Parties agree to co-operate directly or, as appropriate, through the
Organization or relevant regional organizations or arrangements in the promotion and exchange of results of research and development programmes relating to the enhancement of
the state-of-the-art of oil pollution preparedness and response, including technologies and
techniques for surveillance, containment, recovery, dispersion, clean-up and otherwise
minimizing or mitigating the effects of oil pollution, and for restoration.”).
189. Id. art. 12(2) (“In carrying out the activities specified in this article, the Organization shall endeavour to strengthen the ability of States individually or through regional
arrangements to prepare for and combat oil pollution incidents, drawing upon the experience of States, regional agreements and industry arrangements and paying particular attention to the needs of developing countries.”).
190. 1983 Canada-Denmark Agreement for Cooperation Relating to the Marine Environment, pmbl., Aug. 26, 1983, 23 I.L.M. 269 [hereinafter 1983 Agreement].
191. Id. art. II.
192. Id. art. IV(1).
193. Id. art. IV(2).
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conducted over a “reasonable period of time” and in the “best spirit of
cooperation and good neighbourliness.” The Agreement also requires
measures to be taken to ensure installations are “designed, constructed,
placed, equipped, marked, operated and maintained in such a manner
that the risk of pollution . . . is minimized.”194 There is also a mandatory
dispute settlement procedure that requires parties to resort to negotiation if a dispute arises from interpretation or application of the Agreement.195 If a settlement is not reached in six months, then the dispute will
be submitted to an ad hoc tribunal at the request of either party.196 The
procedures of prior notification and consultation may serve as a model
for improving the existing Arctic legal regime.
F. 1993 Agreement between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and
Sweden
Another regional agreement that covers the Arctic area is the 1993
Agreement between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden
(1993 Agreement). The Agreement entered into force in 2003, yet very
little has been written about it. The parties agreed to the general undertaking of “cooperat[ing] in the protection of the marine environment
against pollution of the sea by oil or other harmful substances which
present a grave and imminent danger to the material interests of one or
more Parties.” This agreement applies to both vessels and offshore installations in the internal waters, territorial sea and other fishing grounds,
EEZs, and continental shelves197 of the contracting parties. Obligations
include monitoring,198 investigation,199 reporting,200 production of evidence,201 abatement,202 assistance,203 and exchange of information.204 Articles 9 to 11 deal with issues occurring and resulting from an oil spill.
Similar to OPRC and the 1983 Agreement, the substantive obligations
under this regional agreement could be useful in formulating an integrated Arctic regime.

194. Id. art. V.
195. Id. art. XIII(1).
196. 1983 Agreement, supra note 190, art. XIII(2).
197. 1993 Agreement Between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden Concerning Cooperation in Measures to Deal with Pollution of the Sea by Oil or Other Harmful
Substances, art. 2, Mar. 29, 2003, U.N.T.S. vol. 2084 I-36173 [hereinafter 1993 Agreement].
198. Id. art. 3.
199. Id. art. 4.
200. Id. art. 5.
201. Id. art. 6.
202. Id. art. 7.
203. 1993 Agreement, supra note 197, art. 8.
204. Id. art. 12.
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G. Relevant Principles of International Law
In addition to the agreements described above, general procedural
principles, as well as substantive principles of international law are applicable to the Arctic. The procedural principles include the duties to cooperate,205 assess risk,206 notify and inform of risk,207 and consult,208
notify, and assist in emergencies.209 These principles are also found in
UNCLOS and in some of the above-mentioned agreements. Six substantive principles are particularly relevant to the Arctic situation: sovereignty, no harm, precautionary, sustainable development, polluter pays,
and ecosystem-based management. Depending on a principle’s status in
international law (see section III), the principle may or may not be binding on the Arctic coastal states.
Sovereignty is the starting point for all international agreements.210 The principle of sovereignty in international environmental law
means that states have complete jurisdiction over their natural resources.211 This is counterbalanced by the customary “no harm” principle, which is considered to be a basic obligation of international
environmental law.212 The “no harm” principle requires states to prevent
transboundary harm caused by activities under their jurisdiction and
control.213 Both the sovereignty and “no harm” principles are binding on
Arctic states that are parties to UNCLOS, as found in UNCLOS at article
193. The United States is also bound to the sovereignty principle because
it represents “the basic constitutional doctrine of the law of nations.”214
The “no harm” principle is considered customary international law, and
thus is binding on the United States.215
Closely related to “no harm,” the precautionary principle or approach is an increasingly important principle of international environmental law. It requires that, where there are reasonable grounds for

205. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro,
Braz., June 14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 5 , UNCED
Doc. A/CONF.151.5, 31 I.L.M 873 [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
206. Id. princ. 17.
207. Id. princ. 19.
208. Id.
209. Id. princ. 18.
210. Arie Trouwborst, Lecture on Nature Conservation, International Environmental
Law Seminar, Mar. 20, 2008, Utrecht University; see generally ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 48–53 (Oxford University Press 2005) (2001).
211. SANDS, supra note 2, at 235.
212. Id. at 236.
213. UNCLOS, supra note 98, art. 194(2).
214. BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 287.
215. SANDS, supra note 2, at 236.
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concern that serious or irreversible damage might occur, effective and
proportional measures should be taken to prevent environmental degradation even in the absence of scientific certainty.216 The inclusion of the
principle in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development at the
Earth Summit in 1992 firmly placed precaution on the global stage.217
Under the principle, the benefit of the doubt goes to the environment (in
dubio pro natura).218 The Arctic Council’s PAME working group Guidelines recommend that the precautionary approach be employed when
considering offshore oil and gas activities in the Arctic. Further, OSPAR
fully embraces the precautionary principle. These examples indicate that
the precautionary principle is transforming into customary international
law, thus becoming increasingly binding on all Arctic coastal states.219
The principle of sustainable development seeks to balance economic development interests, especially those of poor countries, with environmental concerns.220 The World Commission on Environment and
Development states that sustainable development implies meeting the
“needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”221 This meta-principle mainly guides policy makers and lawyers in creating, interpreting, and applying national
and international law. The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy embraced the principle of sustainable development by creating a formal
Sustainable Development Working Group. Because of the acceptance of
this principle by the Arctic Council, it appears that the principle is binding on all of the Arctic coastal states.
The polluter pays principle is an “economic policy for allocating
the costs of pollution or environmental damage borne by public authori-

216. Id.
217. Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration states: “In order to protect the environment, the
precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities.
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” Rio Declaration, supra note 205, princ. 15.
218. Trouwborst, supra note 210, at 187.
219. Id. at 187–88. The principle is solidified in more than 60 multilateral treaties and is
embedded in several domestic systems. It was also recognized by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in the Southern Blue Fin Tuna cases and in the MOX Plant case,
and by the WTO Appellate Body in the 1998 Beef Hormones case. See SANDS, supra note 2, at
273–76.
220. D. BARSTOW MAGRAW & L.D. HAWKE, Sustainable Development, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 614–16 (Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée & Ellen Hey eds., Oxford University Press 2007).
221. Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, G.A. Res.
42/187, U.N. DOC. A/RES/42/187 (Dec. 11, 1987).
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ties” rather than an international legal principle.222 However, it has been
used in international and national environmental laws to prescribe liability. PAME’s Guidelines recommend that the polluter pays principle
should be employed223 and OSPAR fully endorses the application of this
principle. Because the principle serves merely as a recommendation, it
does not appear to be binding on all of the Arctic coastal states.
The ecosystem-based management principle is an “emerging paradigm” that shifts management efforts from focusing on particular uses
to a systems approach where ecological processes and interactions are
taken into account in achieving the goals of a management plan.224 This
new and evolving paradigm, while rapidly gaining support and acceptance, has not yet achieved the status of customary international law, partially because the concept has not been implemented, thus it is not
binding on all of the Arctic coastal states. One of the numerous examples
of its growing acceptance, however, is Annex V, article 3(1)(b)(iv) of OSPAR, which requires an integrated ecosystem approach to be taken by
the parties. The above-mentioned procedural and substantive principles
should be taken into account in designing a governance and regulatory
regime for the Arctic.
In sum, the existing agreements and the principles of international
law do not adequately address all of the issues arising from oil and gas
exploration and exploitation on the Arctic coastal states’ continental
shelves. UNCLOS provides a general framework, while OSPAR lays out
substantive provisions for a portion of Arctic waters. MARPOL and
OPRC provide general guidelines for conducting oil and gas activities.
The 1983 Canada-Denmark Agreement and the 1993 Agreement demonstrate cooperative action among Arctic coastal states and the other Arctic
states. The principles of international law provide guidance rather than a
regulatory basis for state conduct. The agreements and principles in total
provide a thin layer of protection for the sensitive Arctic ecosystem and
communities, but fail to establish the coordinated legal framework
needed to meet the challenges of new oil and gas exploration in the Arctic. Sections VI and VII further examine these agreements and recommend ways in which the agreements could be improved so as to provide
greater protection; however, these recommendations must be viewed in
light of Arctic politics.

222. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 53, at 92.
223. PAME Guidelines, supra note 39, § 1.3.
224. STEPHEN BOYLE ET AL., U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME & THE GLOBAL PROGRAMME OF ACTION FOR THE PROT. OF THE MARINE ENV’T FROM LAND-BASED ACTIVITIES, ECOSYSTEM-BASED
MANAGEMENT: MARKERS FOR ASSESSING PROGRESS 5 (2006), available at http://www.gpa.
unep.org/documents/ecosystem-based_management_english.pdf.
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V. ARCTIC GEOPOLITICS: THE “DO NOTHING”
ILULISSAT DECLARATION
On May 28, 2008, political representatives from the five Arctic
coastal states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States)
met in Ilulissat, Greenland.225 Representatives from the three other Arctic
states (Iceland, Finland, and Sweden) were not invited to participate.226
As a result of this meeting, the representatives of the five Arctic coastal
states issued the Ilulissat Declaration stating in clear terms that an existing extensive international legal framework already applies to the Arctic Ocean, and therefore, there is “no need to develop a new
comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean.”227
The Arctic coastal states asserted their respective sovereignty and jurisdictional control and their intention to avoid a comprehensive regional
sea agreement in favor of sectoral cooperative initiatives, such as in the
area of search and rescue.228
The Ilulissat Declaration strategically weaves together existing
agreements and institutions giving the appearance that a comprehensive
and coordinated Arctic framework already exists. At the core of the
“framework” outlined in the Declaration is the principle that the coastal
states, “[by] virtue of their sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction . . . are in a unique position to address these possibilities and challenges.”229 The Arctic coastal states point to UNCLOS, the International
Maritime Organiziation (IMO), the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, and the
Arctic Council as proof of the existence of an international framework.
The Ilulissat Declaration states that the “law of the sea provides
for important rights and obligations concerning the delineation of the
outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the marine environment, including ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research, and other uses of the sea.”230 It is interesting to note that the
Declaration does not specifically refer to UNCLOS but to the law of the sea
in general. One possible reason for this is that the United States has not
ratified UNCLOS. Further, the states unanimously announced that they

225. See THE ILULISSAT DECLARATION, supra note 1.
226. Indigenous Portal, The Ilulissat Declaration from the Arctic Ocean Conference, June 24,
2008, http://www.indigenousportal.com/Politics/The-Ilulissat-declaration-from-theArtic-Ocean-Conference.html.
227. Id.
228. T. Koivurova & D. VanderZwaag, Canada, the European Union and Arctic Ocean Governance: A Tangled and Shifting Seascape and Future Directions, 18 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y
(forthcoming 2010).
229. THE ILULISSAT DECLARATION, supra note 1.
230. Id.
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“remain committed to this legal framework and to the orderly settlement
of any possible overlapping claims.”231 The states also declared that they
will work with the IMO to “strengthen existing measures and [to] develop new measures to improve the safety of maritime navigation and
[to] prevent or reduce the risk of ship-based pollution in the Arctic
Ocean.”232 The Declaration makes clear that the Arctic coastal states will
support the efforts of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and contribute actively to the Arctic Council.
The role of third-party states in the Arctic is not completely absent
from the Declaration. First, the Arctic coastal states commit to take steps
“in accordance with international law both nationally and in cooperation
among the five states and other interested parties to ensure the protection and preservation of the fragile marine environment.”233 The Arctic
coastal states commit to work through bilateral and multilateral arrangements between and among relevant states to promote safety of life at sea
in the Arctic Ocean. The framework described above coordinates management by the coastal states and “users” of the Arctic Ocean through
“national implementation and application of relevant provisions.”234 In
general, the Declaration demonstrates that the Arctic coastal states will
cooperate with each other and with interested parties in the “collection of
scientific data concerning the continental shelf, the protection of the
marine environment, and other scientific research” based on “mutual
trust and transparency” and “through timely exchange of data
analyses.”235
More interesting is what the Ilulissat Declaration does not disclose—the rising tensions concerning state jurisdiction over the outer
continental shelf. The Declaration states that the nations are “committed . . . to the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims,”236
and the purpose of the meeting, according to Denmark’s foreign minister, Per Stig Moeller, was to “sen[d] a signal to local populations and the
rest of the world that [Arctic coastal states] will act responsibly. . . . Hopefully we will once and for all kill the myth that there’s a
‘race for the North Pole’ going on.”237 Yet, it is questionable whether a
simple Declaration can put these tensions to rest.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
GROUP,
ITM.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
THE ILULISSAT DECLARATION, supra note 1.
Id.
Deb Kelly, Arctic Nations Pledge to Defuse Tensions, OIL DAILY: ENERGY INTELLIGENCE
June 3, 2008, http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-34692562_
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In August 2007, Russia planted a flag in a titanium canister on the
seabed near the North Pole to reinforce its territorial and maritime jurisdictional claims over the region.238 This move has been perceived as a
“scramble,” “race,” or “land grab,” which may lead to a “gold rush”239 in
the Arctic. While the Ilulissat Declaration tries to put the perception of a
“gold rush” to rest, the actions by Arctic states demonstrate their great
interest in this previously inaccessible region. Canada plans to increase
its military presence in the region and to establish a deep-water port in
order to assert its sovereignty in the Northwest Passage (a formerly icelocked area). According to Prime Minister Stephan Harper, six to eight
patrol ships will guard what are believed to be Canadian waters.240 On
the policy front, Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Store told the
media that “Norway must ‘strike a balance between achieving its overall
climate policy goals and safeguarding Norwegian interests in the
north.’”241 Nonetheless, the planting of the Russian flag, along with these
other state actions, signify that these countries are serious about asserting their “geopolitical weight” into the delimitation process.242 Despite
the threatening appearance of these actions, the states’ conduct has been
“predominately in accordance with international law” and particularly in
accordance with UNCLOS.243
The unknown status of the Arctic coastal states’ continental
shelves is at the heart of these tensions. Under article 76 of UNCLOS, a
coastal state is entitled to a continental shelf consisting of (1) the seabed
reaching 200 nm from the baselines, and (2) subject to Irish Formula (established by reference to sediment) or Hedberg Formula (established by
reference to fixed points from the foot of the continental slope), any area
of physical continental margin beyond this outer limit.244 A coastal state
can established the outer limit beyond 200 nm by making a submission
to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).245 Russia made a submission pertaining to the limits of its continental shelf in

238. Potts, supra note 3, at 151.
239. Id.
240. Associated Press, Canada to Increase Arctic Military Presence, USA TODAY, July, 9
2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-07-09-canada-arctic_N.htm; Kelly,
supra note 237.
241. Kelly, supra note 237.
242. Potts, supra note 3, at 158.
243. Id.
244. UNCLOS, supra note 98, arts. 76(1), 76(4)(a)(i)–(ii); CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note
96, at 148–49.
245. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 96, at 148–50. See UNCLOS, supra note 98, art.
76(7)–(9).
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2001.246 Norway made such a submission in 2006,247 and other countries
are expected to follow suit. The reason why article 76 is important to the
“realpolitik of the modern Arctic great game” is that article 77 permits a
coastal state to exercise sovereign rights over its continental shelf “for the
purpose of exploring it and exploiting its resources.”248 By making submissions to the CLCS, the Arctic coastal states are ensuring their ability
to explore and exploit oil and gas in the coming years.
Researchers at the Durham University in the United Kingdom created a map of the Arctic depicting disputed maritime jurisdiction and
boundaries in the Arctic region.249 According to the map, there are nine
claims and potential claims to continental shelves beyond 200 nm. These
claims include Denmark’s, Iceland’s, Russia’s, and Norway’s existing
claims, as well as the potential claims made by Canada, Denmark, and
the United States. Interestingly, there are small areas of unclaimed or
unclaimable continental shelf.250 The map demonstrates the complexities
of delimiting the continental shelves in the Arctic.
The Ilulissat Declaration will do nothing to change the Arctic situation. Through the Declaration, the Arctic coastal states exhibit a desire
to freeze development of a comprehensive regional agreement for the
Arctic Ocean area while the melting ice continues to open up opportunities to drill further and further out on the continental shelf. Assuming
that the Arctic coastal states get their way, is there any hope for adequate
protection for the fragile Arctic ecosystem and its vulnerable communities? The following two sections propose options for greater protection:
section VI suggests ways to improve and expand upon the existing legal
arrangements pertaining to the Arctic, and section VII proposes a legally
binding regional Arctic agreement.

246. United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Submissions to
the Commission, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm
(last visited Mar. 12, 2010).
247. Id.
248. King, supra note 97, at 334 (quoting UNCLOS, supra note 98, art. 77(1)) (internal
quotations omitted).
249. Press Release, Durham University Media Relations Office, Arctic Map Plots New
“Gold Rush” (Aug. 6, 2008), available at http://www.dur.ac.uk/news/newsitem/?itemno=
6819&rehref=%2Fnews%Farchive%2F&resubj=%20Headlines.
250. See INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES RESEARCH UNIT, DURHAM UNIVERSITY, MARITIME JURISDICTION AND BOUNDARIES IN THE ARCTIC REGION (2008), available at http://www.dur.ac.
uk/resources/ibru/arctic.pdf.
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VI. OPTION ONE: IMPROVING AND EXPANDING
EXISTING AGREEMENTS
The Ilulissat Declaration demonstrates that Arctic coastal states
prefer to rely on existing mechanisms and potentially developing
sectoral initiatives that relate to specific activities,251 rather than develop
a new international regime to govern the Arctic Ocean. What if the current leaders of the Arctic coastal states have it their way and generally
only the existing agreements apply? This section describes some of the
shortcomings of the existing agreements described in sections III(A) and
IV and provides recommendations for improvements that will support
the protection and preservation of the Arctic marine environment. OSPAR, one of the existing mechanisms, is discussed in the following section because of its potential to develop into a meaningful regional regime
for the Arctic marine area.
A. Arctic Soft Law Instruments
The Arctic Council’s efforts, such as PAME working group’s Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines, are inadequate because the mechanisms are nonbinding and existing technologies are not capable of
cleaning up oil spills under icy Arctic conditions. First, the PAME Guidelines should be revised to recommend that Arctic coastal states adopt
legislation in each of their states that mandates stringent (1) environmental impact assessments, (2) protections for Arctic communities, indigenous peoples, and flora and fauna, (3) safety and environmental
management, (4) monitoring, (5) operating practices, (6) emergency measures, and (7) decommissioning and site clearance protocols. As it stands
now, the Guidelines discuss each of these components, but fall short in
recommending exactly what an Arctic state should do.252
Second, the Arctic states should cooperate through the Arctic
Council to test and to improve spill response technologies. Leading Arctic experts at World Wildlife Fund (WWF) stated in a recent report that
there is “simply no way to clean up a spill in icy waters, due to technological inadequacies, weather, poor light, and of course, ice.”253 The high
level of sensitivity and low-level capacity to clean up spills contributes to
what WWF has coined as the “response gap.”254 Until this gap is filled,

251. See Koivurova & VanderZwaag, supra note 228, at 272.
252. See PAME Guidelines, supra note 39.
253. Neil Hamilton, Oil—A Dark Future for the Arctic, WWF ARCTIC BULLETIN (WWF
Arctic Int’l Programme, Oslo, Nor.), Jan. 2008, at 3, available at http://assets.panda.org/
downloads/ab0108.pdf.
254. Id.
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the report urges the Arctic states to discontinue the expansion of oil and
gas development in the Arctic.255 Since the technologies are unproven
and not market-ready,256 the Arctic coastal states should refrain from permitting new oil and gas exploration and exploitation. Once the technologies are proven to effectively deal with spills, the Arctic states should
update the Guidelines recommending best practices for Arctic conditions. The soft law nature of the existing Arctic arrangement could lead
to unfettered oil and gas exploitation; therefore the Arctic coastal states
have a tremendous responsibility to act with diligence before proceeding
with developments.
B. UNCLOS
UNCLOS, as a framework convention, was not designed to provide substantive details regulating all aspects and uses of the sea; it also
suffers from lack of full participation. The United States is currently not a
party to UNCLOS—a fact that poses difficulties in fully addressing the
delimitation of the outer limits of the Arctic coastal states’ continental
shelves. However, U.S. Senate “advice and consent,” as required for
treaty adoptions, may be close in sight. In 2007, President George W.
Bush urged the Senate “to act favorably on U.S. accession.”257 Currently,
President Barack Obama also supports the ratification of UNCLOS. According to Margaret Hayes, Director of the State Department’s Office of
Ocean and Polar Affairs, the Obama administration has “been in touch
with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee”258 and hopes the Senate
will consider the treaty in 2009.259 On August 7, 2009, the U.S. Coast
Guard icebreaker Healy began a 41-day mission in cooperation with a
Canadian icebreaker to “map unexplored portions of the Arctic seafloor
to prepare for a future claim” under UNCLOS.260 The United States
should become a party to UNCLOS so that the CLCS can accurately assess claims to the outer continental shelves of the Arctic Ocean and ensure the jurisdictional rules in the maritime zones are respected.261
255. See WWF, OIL SPILL RESPONSE CHALLENGES, supra note 43, at 27.
256. Id. at 3.
257. Press Release, U.S. White House, President’s Statement on Advancing U.S. Interests in the World’s Oceans (May 15, 2007), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.
archives.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070515-2.html.
258. Lauren Morello, U.S. Pushes for Law of the Sea Ratification as New Arctic Mapping
Project Begins, NY TIMES, July 29, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/07/29/
29climatewire-us-pushes-for-law-of-the-sea-ratification-as-89174.html.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See generally Mark Jarashow et al., UNCLOS and the Arctic: The Path of Least Resistance, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1587 (2007).
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Yet, the lack of U.S. participation in UNCLOS does not impede the
formulation of implementation agreements among the current signatory
states and nonsignatory states alike. For example, the 1995 United Nations Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks,262
which is “inextricably linked” to UNCLOS, “may be signed and ratified
by a State whether or not it is a party to” UNCLOS.263 A similar agreement that narrowly focuses on offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation could be negotiated whether or not the United States joins
UNCLOS. Within such an agreement, provisions could be included that
pertain specifically to the Arctic.
C. MARPOL 73/78
Due to the unique and hazardous conditions in the Arctic and the
vulnerability of the fragile ecosystem, the “special area” status should be
extended to the Arctic under Annex I of MARPOL 73/78 since the Arctic
is currently not a designated area. Article 16 of MARPOL 73/78 details
the amendment procedures. Amendments can be accomplished through
consideration by the Organization264 or at a meeting of the Conference of
Parties. Under the rules pertaining to amendments after consideration by
the Organization, an amendment to an annex would be accepted by the
parties at the end of a period that is not less than 10 months, unless an
objection is communicated to the Organization by at least one-third of
the parties, or parties constituting at least 50 percent of the gross tonnage
of the world’s merchant fleet.265 Under the rules pertaining to amendments by a conference, upon the request of a party and supported by at
least one-third of the other parties, the Organization will convene a conference. An amendment that receives the support of two-thirds of the
majority present will be adopted.266 Thus, through this amendment process it is possible to designate the Arctic Ocean area as a “special area”
which in turn would prohibit any discharge from rigs without dilution
exceeding 15 parts per million. By doing so, the Arctic coastal states
262. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Conference on
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 6th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/ CONF
164/37 (1995), 34 I.L.M. 1542 (1995).
263. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 96, at 157.
264. The “Organization” is the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization. MARPOL 73/78, supra note 168, art. 2(7). Full text of the Treaty is available at http://
sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/entri/texts/pollution.from.ships.1973.html (last visited Mar. 12,
2010).
265. MARPOL 73/78, supra note 168, art. 16(2)(f)(iii).
266. Id. art. 16(3).
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would categorize oil spills not meeting this standard as not in compliance with the Convention. Thus, MARPOL could provide added protection from the dangers of oil and gas activities in the Arctic.
D. OPRC, 1983 Agreement, and 1993 Agreement
The OPRC and the 1983 and 1993 Agreements contain substantive
provisions that may be valuable to Arctic regulation. Since all of the Arctic coastal states, with the exception of Russia, are parties to the OPRC, it
appears that there is general acceptance of the Convention’s preparedness procedures. It would be beneficial for Russia to either join the Convention, or, in the alternative, that these safety measures be incorporated
into a new legally binding regulatory regime.
The 1983 Canada-Denmark Agreement is limited in scope, yet it
does establish a solid cooperative system for activities that create a significant risk of pollution. The provisions of this agreement should be extended to all Arctic coastal states. The prior notification and dispute
settlement procedures are of particular importance because it is highly
likely that issues will arise from oil and gas exploration and exploitation
of nearby or straddling oil reserves on the continental shelves of two or
more states.
Similar to the 1983 Agreement, the 1993 Agreement lacks full participation by all of the Arctic coastal states. Nonetheless, the provisions
could serve as a model for one regional agreement that includes all the
Arctic coastal states and addresses all aspects of offshore oil and gas activities in the Arctic.
While there are ways the existing agreements could be improved
to provide greater protection for the Arctic marine environment, the opportunities for improvement are outweighed by the innate weaknesses
presented—there is a lack of participation under the existing regimes,
and there is no cohesion between the existing arrangements. In addition,
the current obligations are not stringent enough to protect against the
perils of drilling in the newly ice-free areas. Also, the instruments merely
set up procedures to mitigate potential problems after an accident has
occurred. The following section takes a fresh look at a possible design for
a comprehensive regime that will provide true protection for the Arctic
marine environment.
VII. OPTION TWO: A LEGALLY BINDING
REGIONAL AGREEMENT
Expanding and strengthening the existing Arctic arrangements
may not provide adequate protection for the Arctic marine ecosystems
and for the communities and indigenous peoples dependent on their sur-
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vival. Therefore, Arctic coastal state leaders should consider alternative
regimes (i.e., types of legal arrangements) and mechanisms for prescribing rights and obligations for the Arctic. What has emerged in the Arctic,
and could remain under the current direction laid out in the Ilulissat
Declaration, is an “unplanned institutional complex or collection of institutional arrangements applicable to the same region but not deliberately
structured or integrated to form a coherent governance system.”267 There
is no consensus in the legal/academic community as to what the existing
arrangements are and if they can provide sufficient protection for the
Arctic. One scholar believes “[e]xisting arrangements are doing a creditable job of addressing some elements of the demand for governance in the
far North.”268 While Young recognizes that the status quo is not acceptable, there may be opportunities to improve the Arctic governance
“without creating a counterpart to the Antarctic Treaty System.”269 Another scholar states that many arguments have been made in regards to
consolidating the existing agreements and creating one or more regional
regimes.270 Just recently, WWF commissioned a report that contains a
proposal for a Legally Binding Instrument.271 This section proposes that
all the Arctic states join the OSPAR agreement; its framework potentially
provides an acceptable forum under which the Arctic coastal states may
cooperate. In addition, OSPAR’s mechanisms may be capable of providing a higher level of protection for the fragile Arctic marine environment.
The Arctic should not be governed under an “unplanned institutional complex”272 because the Arctic is so precious and unique, and the
current threats are urgent—climate change impacts are opening the Arctic to development of oil and gas in previously untouched areas. Following are recommendations for restructuring Arctic governance, based on

267. YOUNG, supra note 80, at 5.
268. Id. at 17.
269. Id. (“[T]here is no need to create such a system [referring to “an integrated governance system based on hard law instruments of the sort exemplified” by the ATS] in order to
make progress in meeting the demand for governance in the Arctic. Existing arrangements
are doing a creditable job of addressing some elements of the demand for governance in
the far north.”) It should be noted that in a recent article, Paul Arthur Berkman and Oran R.
Young suggest that “[b]efore sectoral activities accelerate with the diminished sea ice, the
window of opportunity is open for all legitimate stakeholders to forever establish their
common interests in the central Arctic Ocean as an international space dedicated to peaceful uses.” Berkman & Young, supra note 8, at 340.
270. Nowlan, supra note 82, at 57, 66.
271. See TIMO KOIVUROVA & ERIK J. MOLENAAR, WWF INTERNATIONAL ARCTIC PROGRAMME, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION OF THE MARINE ARCTIC: OVERVIEW
AND GAP ANALYSIS (2009), available at http://www.wwf.se/source.php/1223579/Inter
national%20Governance%20and%20Regulation%20of%20the%20Marine%20Arctic.pdf.
272. YOUNG, supra note 80, at 5.
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(1) the type of regime, and (2) mechanisms for protecting the Arctic
marine environment from the impacts of oil and gas exploration and exploitation on the Arctic coastal states’ continental shelves.
A. Type of Regime
1. Legally Binding Agreement
There are four major rationales for transforming the existing soft
law regime into a legally binding regional regime. The first rationale is
that UNCLOS directs the Arctic states to formalize regional cooperation.
For example, if it is determined that the Arctic Ocean is a semi-enclosed
sea, UNCLOS requires that “states bordering . . . [a] semi-enclosed sea
should cooperate with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the
performance of their duties. . . . [T]o this end they shall endeavour, directly or through an appropriate regional organization” to “coordinate
the implementation of their rights and duties with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine environment.”273 By establishing a
regional regime that covers the entire Arctic marine area, Arctic coastal
states would be fulfilling their obligations under UNCLOS.
The second rationale for a legally binding commitment is that it
will “produce higher levels of compliance or conformance than commitments that are not backed by the force of law.”274 The development of a
legally binding agreement will codify the rules, including the existing
legal agreements and principles of law that already apply to parts of the
Arctic Ocean, and will ensure that such rules are explicitly applicable to
the entire area. Through the codification process, inefficiencies and gaps
in the existing “unambitious regime”275 could be resolved. Without overriding the Arctic coastal states’ sovereign rights to explore and exploit
natural resources on their continental shelves, the states could “move
forward on the difficult and emerging multilateral issues.”276 By consensually agreeing to the codification of the rules, the Arctic coastal states
are committing to follow binding international law.
Third, a legally binding regime will prevent a race to the bottom.
As one author explained:

273. UNCLOS, supra note 98, art. 123. For background on the UNCLOS semi-enclosed
seas provisions, see supra section IV(A).
274. ORAN R. YOUNG, THE STRUCTURE OF ARCTIC COOPERATION: SOLVING PROBLEMS/SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES 9 (2004), available at http://arcticparl.org/_res/site/File/static/conf4_
sac.pdf (author states this proposition but argues against it in favor of improving the existing arrangements pertaining to the Arctic).
275. Potts, supra note 3, at 174 (quoting Nowlan, supra note 82, at 8).
276. Potts, supra note 3, at 174.
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An agreed set of legally binding international standards . . . could help to prevent or at least slow, a race to the
bottom, in which states compete in the granting of concessions, exchanging regulatory slackness for greater royalties or
up-front licensing fees, or in times of oversupply, higher oil
prices, simply to attract any business they can.277

Assuming that the Arctic does contain vast amounts of oil and gas, a
regional agreement will ensure that this fragile environment and vulnerable Arctic communities and peoples will not be trampled for the economic benefit of a few states and corporations.
A primary argument against the formation of a legally binding
regime is that creating a new treaty is not politically feasible. The Ilulissat Declaration demonstrates that at the current moment, Arctic coastal
state leaders do not wish to proceed with formulating a new legally
binding agreement. Also, opponents of the formation of a legally binding
regime argue that efforts to address Arctic problems on a case-by-case
basis would be hindered by a “grand but generally unrealistic vision of a
comprehensive, region-wide governance system for the circumpolar
world.”278 Secondary arguments against formulating a legally binding
treaty include: it is expensive and time consuming to formalize a new
treaty; a treaty may even produce weaker commitments than a soft law
regime; it is too soon to formalize cooperation in the region because the
Arctic soft law mechanisms are relatively new; a formal organization
would be expensive to operate; and there are already international treaties that apply to the Arctic, such as UNCLOS, under which the states
can pursue specific goals.279
Some of these arguments are eliminated by narrowing the scope
of a legally binding agreement to a regional regime regulating oil and
gas development, thus using more of a case-by-case approach to the
problem (see section V(A)(2)). Assuming that a legally binding agreement for the Arctic marine area is limited to regulating oil and gas exploration and exploitation, the benefits—cooperation, compliance, and
preventing the race to the bottom—would outweigh the drawbacks—
political uncertainty, distraction from the task at hand, negotiating costs
and time, etc. Therefore, creating a legally binding regime that governs
oil and gas development in the Arctic is necessary to prevent further and
future harm.
277. William V. Dunlap, Regional and International Cooperation in the Regulation of Energy
Resources in the Arctic, in BOUNDARIES AND ENERGY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 301 (Gerald
Blake et al. eds., Kluwer Law International 1998).
278. Nowlan, supra note 82 (citing YOUNG, supra note 274, at 15).
279. Nowlan, supra note 82, at 59–60.
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2. Scope
A legally binding regime could take many different shapes, i.e., a
framework or a regulatory treaty (see section III(A)), and the scope of
membership could encompass only the Arctic coastal states, all of the
Arctic states, or possibly a universal treaty open to all states. When negotiating a treaty, there is often a trade off between seeking a relatively
strong set of substantive commitments and including a broad membership.280 Yet, in the case of the Arctic, the coastal state leaders seem adverse to both binding commitments amongst themselves and broad
membership that includes Arctic and non-Arctic states, because the Arctic coastal states wish to maintain ultimate sovereignty, sovereign rights,
and jurisdiction. Yet, despite the current political climate, scope of membership is still an important factor to consider because, as explained below, issues facing the Arctic affect the interests of Arctic coastal states,
Arctic states, and non-Arctic states.
Scope is an important question in international law because international law is consensual in nature.281 Two options pertaining to scope
include: (1) the more politically feasible option of a regional agreement
among the Arctic coastal states, and (2) the more idealistic option of a
universal treaty that regulates all of the potential uses of the newly icefree Arctic marine environment.
If there was a significant shift in Arctic coastal states’ attitudes,
whether brought on by public outcry or change in leadership, then a
regional agreement, either in the form of a framework or regulatory
treaty, may be the most effective and politically palatable option for Arctic protection. The Arctic coastal states could establish a multilateral
treaty amongst themselves that clearly defines the rights of each state to
explore and exploit oil and gas on the continental shelf and their obligations in conducting such activities; however, a more streamlined option
may be for all Arctic coastal states to join the existing OSPAR
Convention.
OSPAR is an innovative and holistic approach to sustainable management of the maritime area, but under its current form, the Convention is not fully applicable to the Arctic Ocean; Canada, Russia, and the
United States are not parties to it, and the OSPAR area does not cover all
of the Arctic waters. However, there is a possibility of expanding both
the membership of OSPAR and the maritime area.
According to the OSPAR Convention, Contracting Parties may
unanimously invite states that are not bordering the OSPAR maritime

280. GUZMAN, supra note 54, at 172.
281. See supra section III(A).
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area to accede to the Convention. Such an accession would trigger the redefinition of the maritime area requiring a unanimous vote by the Contracting Parties.282 Thus, Canada, Russia, and the United States could join
OSPAR in order to create a unified regional regime that applies to all of
the Arctic. It is important to note that Region I of OSPAR already covers
some of the Arctic Waters.283
UNCLOS encourages regional and international agreements. For
example, if it is determined that the Arctic Ocean is a semi-enclosed sea,
as explained above, Arctic coastal states are required to coordinate the
implementation of their rights and duties with respect to protection and
preservation of the marine environment.284 Even if these articles do not
apply, part XII, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment,
article 197 requires states to cooperate on a global basis directly or
through a competent international organization in the formulation of international rules, standards, and recommended practices and procedures
consistent with UNCLOS for the protection and preservation of the
marine environment.285 Further, article 208, regarding pollution from seabed activities subject to national jurisdiction, requires “[s]tates, acting especially through competent international organizations or diplomatic
conference” to “establish global and regional rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment”286 that arises “from or in connection
with sea-bed activities subject to their jurisdiction and from artificial islands, installations and structures under their jurisdiction.”287 Thus the
establishment of a regional regime covering the entire Arctic marine environment is in line with the Arctic coastal states’ duties under UNCLOS
and is necessary because UNCLOS does not prescribe specific measures,
but only requires cooperation in formulating rules.
There are also strong arguments for expanding an Arctic regime
so that it is universal in scope—meaning open to all nation-states. Calls
for a universal treaty are best viewed in light of the other potential op-

282. OSPAR Convention, supra note 134, art. 27(2).
283. OSPAR Commission, Region I—Arctic Waters, http://www.ospar.org/content/
content.asp?menu=00420211000000_000000_000000 (last visited Mar. 12, 2010). The website
describes Region I, Arctic Waters, as: “[T]he northern OSPAR region, characterized by
harsh climate and ice coverage. Although there is a low population density, human activities such as fishing and offshore petroleum production are relatively important. The ecosystems in Region I are rich, in particular it is one of the most important seabird regions in
the world.”
284. UNCLOS, supra note 98, art. 123(b).
285. UNCLOS, supra note 98, art. 197.
286. Id. art. 208(5).
287. Id. art. 208(1).
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portunities and threats facing the region, namely shipping and fishing.
As one author explained, new opportunities and threats facing the Arctic
may potentially provide a backdrop for “a discussion based on the common good rather than national self-interest.”288 Therefore, good reasons
exist to support a universal-in-scope Arctic marine environmental treaty
(AMET) that covers the entire Arctic marine area and all its uses, and is
inclusive of all states involved or planning to be involved in Arctic affairs. An AMET could serve as a counterpart to the Antarctic Treaty
System.
There are six primary arguments for a universal-in-scope AMET.
First, non-Arctic states have substantial interests in the region. The interests of the Arctic coastal states are quite clear, namely their sovereignty
and sovereign rights in conducting resource extraction.289 The interests of
non-Arctic states include the protection and preservation of the marine
environment,290 biodiversity,291 sustainable development,292 the application of the precautionary and polluter pays principles,293 energy security,294 and access to new shipping routes295 and fisheries. Because nonArctic states have significant interests, an argument could be made that
an AMET is needed to balance the rights and duties of the Arctic coastal
states with the interests of non-Arctic states.
Second, the Arctic is important to all states because of its intrinsic
value.296 As the “largest and least fragmented” inhabited region on Earth,

288. Potts, supra note 3, at 175.
289. See UNCLOS, supra note 98, arts. 77(1)–(4).
290. As evidenced by the wide adoption of UNCLOS, which contains part XII (Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment).
291. As evidenced by the near universal adoption of the Convention on Biological
Diversity. See Convention on Biological Diversity, List of Parties, http://www.cbd.int/
information/parties.shtml (last visited June 10, 2008).
292. For example, the Arctic Council created a Sustainable Development Working
Group.
293. For more information about these principles, see supra section IV(G).
294. PAPER FROM THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 9 (Mar. 14, 2008) [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY], available at http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/99387.pdf.
295. Jesper Hansen, Increasing Non-Arctic Interest in the Arctic Council, ARCTIC COUNCIL,
Apr. 18, 2008, http://arctic-council.org/article/2008/4/increasing_non-arctic_interest_in_
the_arctic_council (stating that the Arctic is becoming geopolitically important, therefore
more and more states and non-state actors want to play a role in the council or industrial
development; e.g., China was planning to send six representatives to an Arctic Council
meeting in Norway).
296. See 1991 Protocol, supra note 89, art. III(1) (“The protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems and the intrinsic value of Antarctica,
including its wilderness and aesthetic values and its value as an area for the conduct of
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the Arctic is home to over 30 distinct indigenous cultures297 and comprises vast areas of “fjords and tundra, jagged peaks and frozen seas,
glaciers and icebergs,” and is home to endangered polar bears, ringed
seals, caribou, arctic foxes, beluga whales and narwhals, sea eagles, and
snowy owls.298
Because these characteristics are endemic to the Arctic, non-Arctic
states may wish to see them protected for their aesthetic and scientific
values, as it would add to humanity’s understanding of the global environment. Beyond these characteristics, the protection of Arctic ice is important for all because large amounts of water are stored in ice caps.
Scientists have found that the contraction of the Arctic ice cap is accelerating climate change, because when ice-cover melts, the earth absorbs
more sunlight, which in turn increases temperatures.299 Also, the melting
of glaciers and land-based ice sheets contributes to sea level rise, impacting low-lying areas on a global scale.300 While an AMET cannot mitigate the impacts of climate change, it could prevent damage from oil and
gas development, which in turn may help to increase the resiliency of the
Arctic marine environment so it can better cope with the impacts of climate change.
A third argument in favor of an AMET is that there is already
evidence of international cooperation and non-Arctic state participation
in Arctic affairs. As described in section III(B), non-Arctic states can obtain observer status on the Arctic Council. Currently, China, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom
are Arctic Council observers.301 While these states cannot vote on the
Council, they play an active role and seek to influence Arctic affairs by
attending meetings, making statements at the discretion of the Council
chair, and submitting documents.302 If international treaty negotiations

scientific research, in particular research essential to understanding the global environment, shall be fundamental considerations in the planning and conduct of all activities in
the Antarctic Treaty area”).
297. Arctic Council, About Arctic Council, http://arctic-council.org/article/about (last
visited Mar. 12, 2010).
298. WWF Arctic, supra note 33.
299. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, Global Warming Puts Arctic on Thin Ice, http://www.
nrdc.org/globalwarming/qthinice.asp (last visited Jan. 9, 2010).
300. Id.
301. Non-Arctic Countries Want Membership in Arctic Council, BARENTSOBSERVER, Mar. 10,
2008, http://www.barentsobserver.com/non-arctic-countries-want-membership-in-arcticcouncil.4516094-16180.html.
302. Arctic Council, Rules of Procedure, SAO Report (Iqaluit), Annex 1, as adopted by
the Arctic Council at the First Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, in Iqaluit, Can., at 38
(Sept. 17–18, 1998), available at http://www.arctic-council.org/filearchive/official%20
rules%20and%20procedures.pdf.
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were to begin, it is likely that these observers would participate in the
development of a comprehensive international regime.
Another piece of evidence indicating non-Arctic state influence in
the region is the European Union’s Northern Dimension policy, which
covers the European Arctic and sub-Arctic areas.303 The policy aims at
“providing a common framework for the promotion of dialogue and
concrete cooperation, strengthening stability, wellbeing and intensified
economic cooperation, promotion of economic integration and competitiveness and sustainable development in Northern Europe.”304 One of the
priority sectors of the Northern Dimension is “environment, nuclear
safety and natural resources, including . . . protection of the Arctic ecosystems.”305 Under this policy umbrella, non-Arctic European states work
directly with Iceland, Norway, Russia, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden in
the governance of the Arctic marine area.306
Fourth, there is a strong international security argument that the
Arctic should be managed through a treaty system rather than at the
whim of the five Arctic coastal states or the powerless Arctic Council. A
paper from the High Representative of the European Commission to the
European Council, Climate Change and International Security, highlights
the growing geopolitical importance of the Arctic due to the rapid melting of the polar ice caps, which is resulting in new waterways and international trade, as well as large new reserves of hydrocarbons.307 Dr. Joe
Borg, Member of the European Commission, said that this “accessibility,
in conjunction with territorial claims, is changing the geo-strategic dynamics of the region with potential consequences for international stability and for European security, trade and resource interests.”308 This new
level of accessibility raises concerns for all nations and not just the Arctic
coastal states. A universal AMET could lay down rules that would apply
to all states, thus facilitating cooperation—rather than increasing tensions—in the development and protection of Arctic resources.309
303. European Union, Northern Dimension Policy Framework Document, at 1 (Nov. 24,
2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_dim/docs/frame_pol_
1106_en.pdf.
304. Id. at 3(10).
305. European Union, Northern Dimension Policy Framework Document, supra note
303, at 5.
306. Id. at 1.
307. CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, supra note 294, at 8.
308. Dr. Joe Borg, Member of the European Commission Responsible for Fisheries and
Maritime Affairs, The Arctic: A Matter of Concern to Us All, Speech Before the Nordic
Council of Ministers (Sept. 9, 2008) (transcript available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press
ReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/08/415&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&
guiLanguage=en).
309. See CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, supra note 294, at 9.
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While somewhat semantic, a fifth, yet still valuable, argument for
a universal AMET is that the fate of the Arctic is a common concern to all
of humankind. It should be acknowledged that it is not realistic to make
the Arctic purely a preserve, because the Arctic coastal states are unlikely
to give up their undisputed sovereign rights to their continental shelves,
and they are even more unlikely to give up their undisputed sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction in the Arctic. However, similar
to the opening line in the UNFCCC, which reads that the parties to the
Convention acknowledge that “change in the Earth’s climate and its adverse effects are a common concern of humankind,”310 the melting of
Arctic ice causing sea-level rise around the world, the irreversible loss of
the unique Arctic ecosystem, and the impacts on indigenous peoples and
communities are common concerns of humankind. It is not a coincidence
that the recent speech by Dr. Borg, to members of the European Commission, given at the conference of Arctic coastal states in Ilulissat, Greenland on September 9, 2008 was entitled, “The Arctic: A Matter of Concern
to Us All.” Dr. Borg, by representing the European Union, was speaking
on behalf of non-Arctic and Arctic states.311 Because of his unique position, his speech was quite possibly intended to elicit cooperation between Arctic coastal states, Arctic states, and non-Arctic states.312

310. UNFCCC, supra note 6, pmbl.
311. The European Union (EU) consists of 27 member states. Denmark, Finland, and
Sweden are both EU members and Arctic States; however, Iceland is an Arctic state, but not
an EU member. Canada, Norway, Russia, and the United States are not EU member states,
but are Arctic coastal states. It should be noted that none of the current EU member states
are Arctic Ocean coastal states. Koivurova & VanderZwaag, supra note 228, at 254. (“The
fact that none of the current EU Member States are coastal states with respect to the Arctic
Ocean (not even via the European Economic Area Agreement or via Greenland, which
chose in the mid-1980s to withdraw from the then European Economic Community, and
hence is not part of the European Communities or the EU) is clearly a major feature and
constraint of EU policy regarding the Arctic Ocean.”).
312. Dr. Borg mentioned in his speech that the European Commission would be publishing a Communication on the Arctic later in 2008. Borg, supra note 308, at 3. On November 20, 2008, the Commission for the European Communities (the Commission) launched a
communication regarding the EU’s relationship to the Arctic region. Also, the European
Parliament adopted a resolution on Arctic Governance suggesting that the Commission:
[B]e prepared to pursue the opening of international negotiations designed to lead to the adoption of an international treaty for the protection
of the Arctic, having as its inspiration the Antarctic Treaty, as supplemented by the Madrid Protocol signed in 1991, but respecting the fundamental difference represented by the populated nature of the Arctic and
the consequent rights and needs of the peoples and nations of the Arctic
region; believ[ing], however, that as a minimum starting-point such a
treaty could at least cover the unpopulated and unclaimed area at the centre of the Arctic Ocean.
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If complete Arctic marine environmental protection is the goal,
one may try to argue that an AMET is “in the interest of mankind as a
whole,” or even that the Arctic is part of the “common heritage of mankind.”313 The 1991 Protocol to the Arctic Treaty used “in the interest of
mankind” to suggest that all states have a duty of protection but not a
“right” to resources.314 This is different than the concept of the “common
heritage of mankind” found in part XI of UNCLOS. That concept infers
equitable sharing of benefits from the use of resources that are part of the
“common heritage of mankind.”315 The Arctic coastal states will not classify resources, such as oil and gas located on their continental shelves
that they have sovereign rights to, as “common heritage.” Yet the former
concept, “in the interest of mankind,” may be more palatable because it
could allow for the Arctic coastal states to retain their sovereign rights
while recognizing that the preservation and protection of the Arctic
marine environment is a shared interest among Arctic and non-Arctic
states. Declaring the fate of the Arctic marine environment as a “common
concern” is less likely to offend the Arctic coastal states than “in the interest of mankind,” because it does not imply that third party states have a
right to limit Arctic coastal states’ sovereign rights in the marine area,
but merely that the Arctic is a matter of concern to all states.
A sixth argument in favor of a universal AMET is that climate
change, which is causing severe impacts inside the Arctic, is a problem
originating outside of the Arctic, thus all states have a responsibility to
protect the Arctic marine environment. However, there is not much an
AMET could do to stop the damage caused by climate change, because a
treaty focusing on the Arctic marine environment could not prescribe
rules for activities taking place outside of the area. Many rightfully argue
that the best way (and probably only way) to prevent Arctic melt is to
ensure the successful implementation of the international climate change
agreement in tandem with a regional Arctic treaty aimed at protecting
and preserving the marine environment. Because Arctic protection depends on slowing the growth of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,
Arctic coastal states should support the current GHG reduction targets
established in the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, and demand that non-

European Parliament Resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic Governance, PARL. EUR.
DOC. at 15, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP/
/TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2008-0474+0‡OC+XML+V0//EN.
313. Id.
314. GREG MAGGIO & OWEN J. LYNCH, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS, ENVIRONMENT, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: EXISTING AND EMERGING
STANDARDS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL SOCIETY, pt. IV (1997), http://www.ciel.
org/Publications/olp3iv2.html.
315. Id.
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Arctic states participate. Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol requires developed states to reduce their overall GHG emissions “by at least 5 percent
below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008–2012.”316 The parties to
the UNFCCC and the Kyoto protocol are now considering post-2012
commitments.317 The near universal-in-scope Kyoto Protocol is a far better forum for global cooperation to reduce GHGs than an AMET. It is
critical that countries cooperate under this framework so as to protect the
Arctic and other fragile environments and communities from the impacts
of climate change.
The Arctic coastal states should create a legally binding regional
agreement that lays down rules on when, how, and where these states
can conduct oil and gas exploration and exploitation on their continental
shelves. A legally binding agreement is necessary because UNCLOS requires the Arctic coastal states to cooperate and will ensure compliance
while preventing a race to the bottom. While a universal-in-scope AMET
that regulates all uses of the Arctic marine environment would be ideal
in some respects, a regional-in-scope Arctic agreement that regulates oil
and gas exploration and exploitation in the newly ice-free areas is more
politically palatable.
B. Mechanisms
1. Purpose
Just as OSPAR could expand membership to include all of the
Arctic coastal states, the Convention’s purpose could cover the challenges facing the Arctic. The purpose of an expanded OSPAR Convention would remain the same: “to prevent and eliminate marine pollution
and to achieve sustainable management of the marine area.”318 As in the
original Convention, the parties to an expanded OSPAR could adopt
binding decisions, recommendations, programs, and measures that
could alter the sovereign rights of Arctic coastal states in conducting oil
and gas exploration and exploitation on their continental shelves.
2. Institutional Body
If OSPAR is expanded, there is already a solid organization, the
OSPAR Commission, in place and coordinated by a permanent Secreta-

316. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, art. 3(1).
317. See UNFCCC, FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, REPORT OF THE AD
HOC WORKING GROUP ON FURTHER COMMITMENTS FOR ANNEX I PARTIES UNDER THE KYOTO
PROTOCOL ON ITS RESUMED SIXTH SESSION, HELD IN POZNAÑ FROM 1 TO 10 DECEMBER 2008 17
(2008), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/awg6/eng/08.pdf.
318. OSPAR Convention, supra note 134, at pmbl.
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riat based in London. The Secretariat and Commission have already established a successful track record in the Northeast Atlantic. For
example, in 2008, the Contracting Parties agreed to strengthen its work
towards establishing a Marine Protected Area (MPA) in the high seas of
the Northeast Atlantic.319 This commitment demonstrates that a highly
coordinated group of states could commit to legally binding measures
that alter their rights—something that could never be accomplished by
nations working independently or even bilaterally.
The OSPAR Commission would provide a superior level of coordination that is not currently practiced by the Arctic Council. As an example of the current lack of coordination and political commitment, a
biennial Arctic Council meeting was attended by only three Ministers
representing their countries.320 Meetings are an important component to
coordination and require high-level participation. Under OSPAR, the
Arctic coastal states’ representatives to the OSPAR Commission, along
with the other contracting parties’ representatives, would be required to
meet at least once a year.321 Further, at the request of three or more contracting parties, the Chairman of the Commission is required to convene
an extraordinary meeting “as soon as practicable.”322 The requirement for
yearly meetings will help ensure that the Arctic coastal states communicate on an annual basis and forge progress on controversial issues, while
the availability of the extraordinary meetings provides Arctic coastal
states with a means to rapidly respond to challenges in a coordinated
fashion.
The Rules of Procedure for the OSPAR Commission afford noncontracting parties, international governmental organizations, and
NGOs the opportunity to participate in its meetings. The Commission
may unanimously decide to admit these third parties—represented by
observers—at its meetings, although participation may be restricted.323
These provisions may compensate for the lack of non-Arctic state involvement and provide a venue for third party concerns to be heard in a
legally binding forum. While this is far from a universal treaty, it is one

319. Press Release, OSPAR Commission, OSPAR Pioneers the Protection of the High
Seas: OSPAR on Track to Meet the New EU Marine Directive (June 26, 2008), available at
http://www.ospar.org/content/news_detail.asp?menu=00600725000000_000001_000000.
320. Nowlan, supra note 82, at 58.
321. OSPAR Commission, Rules of Procedure of the OSPAR Commission, As Revised
at OSPAR 2001 (Annex 29), OSPAR 2002 (Annex 10), OSPAR 2005 (Annex 25), rule 4, available at http://www.ospar.org/documents/DBASE/DECRECS/Agreements/05-17e_Rules%
20of%20Procedure.doc.
322. Id. rule 5.
323. Id. rule 9.

R

\\server05\productn\N\NMN\49-3-4\NMN3403.txt

878

unknown

Seq: 54

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

26-MAY-10

16:06

[Vol. 49

means of ensuring the Arctic states could be held accountable by interests beyond their own borders.
3. Provisions
Once all of the Arctic coastal states become parties to OSPAR, decisions and complementary recommendations could be adopted to regulate offshore oil and gas activities in the Arctic. The recommendations for
expanding and improving the existing Arctic arrangements (see section
VI) could be codified under one regional Arctic agreement. OSPAR also
lays out specific objectives aimed at achieving the overall purpose of
preventing and eliminating marine pollution. Under article 3, any dumping of wastes or other matter from offshore installations in the Arctic
marine area would be prohibited, and discharges and emissions would
be regulated, as provided under article 4. The Arctic coastal states would
retain permitting authority under article 5; however, according to Annex
III, the OSPAR Commission would continue to: (1) collect information
about substances and list substances which are toxic, persistent, and liable to bioaccumulate; (2) devise plans to reduce and phase out use or
discharge of these substances from offshore sources; (3) draw up criteria,
guidelines, and procedures for the prevention of pollution from the
dumping of disused offshore installations and of disused offshore pipelines, and the leaving in place of offshore installations; and (4) draw up
criteria, guidelines, and procedures relating to the placement of disused
offshore installations and disused offshore pipelines with a view towards preventing and eliminating pollution.324 As opposed to the Arctic
Council’s Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines, the criteria, guidelines, and
procedures drawn up by the OSPAR Commission would be legally binding on the entire Arctic marine area, thus affording a greater level of
protection.
The Arctic coastal states could nominate a wide range of MPAs
under OSPAR’s Annex V. Under Annex V, as contracting parties, the
Arctic coastal states could nominate particularly sensitive areas that are
currently being damaged by climate change and that would be further
damaged by offshore oil and gas drilling.
Arctic coastal states may want to consider including an obligation
for a stringent transboundary EIA in Annex V of OSPAR that is stronger
than what is already required under article 206 of UNCLOS.325 In accordance with the precautionary principle, the threshold for triggering an
324. OSPAR Convention, supra note 134, Annex III, art. 10.
325. See generally United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, http://www.unece.org/
env/eia/eia.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2010).
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EIA should be lower than “substantial pollution” and “significant and
harmful change” because the Arctic ecosystem is already under severe
stress from climate change and oil and gas exploration in formerly icecovered areas. The EIA requirements under Annex I of the 1991 Environmental Protocol for the Antarctic, which impose stringent standards on
activities having more than a minor or transitory impact, should serve as
an example. Under a rigorous EIA, the immediate impacts of oil and gas
development could be considered alongside the impacts of climate
change which are already threatening the environment.
Under the OSPAR regime, the Arctic coastal states would be
obliged to apply the precautionary principle,326 the polluter pays principle,327 the best available techniques and best environmental practices
principles,328 and to take an ecosystem based approach to managing the
Arctic marine environment.329 These principles should influence the type
of mechanisms put in place and their level of stringency. For example,
the precautionary, best available techniques, and best environmental
practices principles may prevent the Arctic coastal states from hastily
developing oil and gas resources on their continental shelves without
having carefully considered its actions. It should be noted, that OSPAR
does nothing to preclude the Arctic coastal states—via Commission decision—from freezing new oil and gas development until the potential environmental impacts are fully understood (as required by the
precautionary principle) and the technologies are proven and market
ready (as required by the principles of best available techniques and best
environmental practices). This, of course, would have implications on existing operations. One could argue that existing and already permitted
operations could continue, but new operations in the hypothetically expanded Arctic Waters Region of OSPAR would be put on hold because
there are reasonable grounds for concern that new oil and gas activities
using the existing technologies would cause serious or irreversible damage. The restriction could be lifted once the OSPAR Commission understood the full extent of environmental consequences, mitigation
mechanisms were in place, and the technologies were ready so as to conduct operations in an environmentally sound manner with the capability
to clean up spills. Thus, while the principles in themselves do not prescribe certain actions, they do help inform states of the types of rules that
should be put in place.

326.
327.
328.
329.
134.

OSPAR Convention, supra note 134, art. 2(2)(a).
Id. art. 2(2)(b).
Id. art. 2(3)(b).
This is not explicitly stated in the Convention. See OSPAR Convention, supra note

R

R

\\server05\productn\N\NMN\49-3-4\NMN3403.txt

880

unknown

Seq: 56

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

26-MAY-10

16:06

[Vol. 49

The current challenges in the Arctic demand a higher level of protection. OSPAR has the potential to prevent and to help eliminate pollution from the Arctic marine environment. There is already a solid
Commission in place, supported by the Secretariat based in London.
Under the Convention’s articles and annexes, the Arctic coastal states
could establish mechanisms that would apply directly to oil and gas exploration and exploitation in Arctic waters. A stringent EIA procedure
could govern whether, when, and how such activities would take place.
There are also opportunities to protect particular special marine areas.
The OSPAR approach integrates the important principles of international
law such as the precautionary, best available techniques, and best environmental practices principles. Therefore, an expanded OSPAR is a protective option available to the Arctic coastal states.
VIII. CONCLUSION: SOFTENING OF ICE DEMANDS
HARDENING OF LAW
The Arctic marine environment is so precious and unique, and the
current situation—the intensification of climate change impacts opening
the Arctic up to oil and gas development in previously untouched areas—is so urgent, that the Arctic coastal states should depart from their
current stance taken in the Ilulissat Declaration. The existing agreements
and international organizations recognized in the Declaration will not be
effective in confronting the new challenges facing the Arctic due to a lack
of participation and cohesion, and because the existing obligations are
not stringent enough to protect against the perils of drilling in newly ice
free areas.
By not moving forward with a comprehensive regional regime,
the Arctic coastal states are ignoring trends in international environmental law and acting contrary to general principles of international law,
such as the precautionary principle. There is substantial legal support for
the adoption of a binding regional Arctic marine agreement. UNCLOS
directs parties, such as the Arctic coastal states, to move forward in a
coordinated fashion in developing rules for the protection and preservation of the marine environment and the regulation of offshore activities.
OSPAR provides a ready-made framework under which the Arctic
coastal states may act. There is an opportunity for the Arctic coastal
states to retain their sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction without sacrificing the fragile Arctic marine environment. In accordance with
the rules and principles of international law, the Arctic states should
move forward with the development of a comprehensive regional Arctic
marine environment agreement that consolidates and strengthens the existing mechanisms that apply to oil and gas exploration and exploitation
on the Arctic coastal states’ continental shelves.
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While politics continue to freeze the adoption of a new and binding Arctic marine environment agreement, the Arctic’s ice will continue
to melt and oil and gas activities on the Arctic coastal states’ continental
shelves will increase. Public concern inside and outside of the Arctic will
also intensify. WWF is calling for a moratorium on new offshore oil development in the Arctic until the oil spill response gap is filled.330 The
Arctic coastal states can address public concerns by adopting a regional
Arctic marine environment agreement facilitating the adoption of rules
and standards to oversee the new opportunities and threats.

330. Neil Hamilton, Director, WWF International Arctic Programme, Should There Be a
Future for Oil and Gas in the Arctic?, Presentation for Arctic Frontiers 2008 (Jan. 22, 2008),
in ARCTIC FRONTIERS 2008 DOWNLOADS, at 32, http://www.arctic-frontiers.com/index.
php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=40&Itemid=155 (follow 04 Hamilton
hyperlink).
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